

**IMPACT EVALUATION OF RESEARCH BY THE
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE
LIBERALIZATION, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, AND WTO'S
DOHA NEGOTIATIONS**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report assesses the impact of IFPRI's work on the agriculture negotiations in the WTO's Doha Round. It is set against the context of IFPRI's mission which emphasizes food security and the interests of poor people in low-income countries and underlines the importance of active engagement in policy communications to link research work to policy action. The report also traces briefly the evolution of IFPRI's work on international agricultural trade more generally, noting its broad disposition to market-oriented policy prescriptions while illuminating the very different impacts of agricultural trade liberalization on individual developing countries through detailed research at the national and household level.

IFPRI's Research in the Context of the Evolving Doha Negotiations

An outline of key developments in the Doha negotiations is provided as context for a review of over 100 IFPRI publications on or related to the WTO negotiations as well as training and capacity building activities completed between 1999 to July 2008.

The report notes the active attention directed by IFPRI from the late 1990s through to the breakdown of negotiations in Cancun in September 2003 to the interests of developing countries in the Doha negotiations. Important contributions were made by IFPRI to debate about the scope of the Round through thoughtful analysis of the "development box" issue and calls for exemption for developing countries from some liberalization disciplines in the interests of preserving food security. Innovative work in 2002 on the impact of U.S. cotton policies on poor farmers in Benin had a major impact. Other useful IFPRI work included modeling the likely impacts on developing countries of further trade liberalization.

IFPRI appeared to step back somewhat from active engagement in Doha-related work from late 2003 to early 2005. This period encompassed a major reorganization affecting IFPRI's Division responsible for trade research. There was also some disruption caused by senior staff departures. Some Doha relevant work was undertaken in this period, including PSE studies of key developing countries and detailed South Asia country studies. By comparison, however, with the elevated interest and involvement in Doha by the World Bank and high profile development advocacy groups, IFPRI played a limited role at a time when the development implications of agricultural trade liberalization was at the centre of debate.

IFPRI's involvement in agricultural trade research was built up progressively from early 2005 through to the end of this review in July 2008. Recruitment of new staff and the establishment of close links with the French researchers at CEPII brought about a revival in IFPRI's modeling capability. Influential new work using the MAcMaps database (subsequently adopted by the GTAP Project) provided much richer and more nuanced treatment of the differential impact of various trade liberalization scenarios on different groups of developing countries. Other work on developed country agriculture policies, especially the U.S. Farm Bill, attracted attention. IFPRI research became more closely attuned to real time debate in the negotiations with a number of well timed and targeted contributions through to the collapse of negotiations in July 2008. These included work on the duty and quota free access provisions (DFQF) for LDCs, the question of

tariff preference erosion, the impact of trade liberalization of African agriculture and further global impact assessment work focused on developing countries. Through this period IFPRI staff also played a more active role in reaching out to the media and working in collaboration with leading think tanks and development advocacy groups.

Stakeholder Views of IFPRI's Work on Doha

Direct sampling of views on IFPRI's work through interviews and surveying of 114 respondents in well placed target groups formed a key part of this impact evaluation.

Consistent with its mission to link research to policy action, the task outline for the review stressed the importance of the perceptions of policymakers and others engaged in policy debate. A major effort was made to reach key government advisers and trade negotiators, including chairs of WTO negotiating groups or related bodies and WTO Ambassadors coordinating group positions (G20, G33, Cairns Group, Africa Group) in the negotiations. Other respondents included leading researchers on agricultural trade, senior staff of the WTO (including the Director General) and other relevant international organizations, senior staff of influential think tanks and development advocacy groups and expert staff in business and legal firms. Detailed results are in Section V of the report.

IFPRI's work was positively regarded across most groups with particularly high rankings on criteria of usefulness and quality from respondents in think tanks, advocacy groups and academic researchers. Disappointingly for IFPRI, the views of government officials and those from international organizations were somewhat less positive, in many cases reflecting less familiarity with IFPRI's work. Research on Doha from the World Bank was most commonly cited as having been influential. Attributes appreciated by those who knew IFPRI's work included its objectivity and clear focus on development impacts.

Citations and Media Reporting of IFPRI's Work

Google Scholar citations and downloads from RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) and the IFPRI website were captured for the IFPRI materials under review. Comparative data are shown for the IFPRI materials across several years. The results are reported in Section VI of the report and were similar to the perceptions of stakeholders in the survey and interviews although strong interest in IFPRI's PSE work and analysis of food regulation is notable. A comparison was conducted of citations and downloads of work from IFPRI and parallel work from the World Bank and the Carnegie Endowment showing reasonable strong performance for IFPRI.

Illustrating Pathways to Influence in IFPRI Work

Section VII of the report takes four "high impact" pieces of IFPRI research and traces the ways in which the work influenced policies in national governments, parliaments and in some cases the WTO's processes. The examples are:

- Reform of global cotton markets and rural poverty in Benin
- Duty Free and Quota Free Market Access for LDCs through the Doha negotiations
- Re-positioning in Pakistan's trade policy
- Modeling trade scenarios in Peru

Conclusions and Lessons for the Future

This report concludes that despite a dip around 2003–2005, IFPRI has done much to recover and build on its earlier standing as a credible and influential research provider in the field of international agricultural trade reform. It is now well focused on its core mandate through its attention to the impacts of liberalization on developing countries, especially the poorest, and its work has been increasingly targeted to relevant issues in the negotiations.

IFPRI is strongly encouraged to continue its restored emphasis on trade analysis regardless of whether the Doha negotiations can be revived following their recent collapse. More than ever before, tensions within the WTO membership about further steps in liberalization have foundered over differences on the nature and extent of special and differential treatment for developing countries. Debate in the public domain and in the negotiations themselves on these issues has been highly politicized and only weakly informed by high quality, objective analysis. IFPRI's work demonstrates its comparative strength in precisely this area. It will have a role to play even if further reform steps in the next years occur through unilateral national policy moves or through bilateral or regional trade agreements rather than the WTO.

The report does not suggest any diminution in IFPRI's attention to high quality, peer-reviewed analysis or to the depth of knowledge and capability among its research teams at headquarters and in the field on circumstances in the agriculture sectors in key developing countries. It does, however, argue for a modest enhancement in its engagement with policy makers and advocates, including in Geneva. This process has already begun, notably through recent collaborative projects with CEPII, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and work with research staff of the World Bank. Further work is also encouraged with the leading think tanks and development advocacy groups active in public debate about agricultural trade reform, building on very productive collaboration in recent years with the Hewlett Foundation, Bread for the World, and the German Marshall Fund.

A new trade publication series on agricultural trade is suggested for IFPRI's consideration, perhaps in the form of an annual report which could include analysis of agricultural trade trends in developing countries. The landmark OECD monitoring reports of agricultural policies are proposed as a possible model although a more modest approach to indicator development would be required given resource constraints.

1. INTRODUCTION

In December 2007, I was contracted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to conduct an impact evaluation of its work relevant to the WTO's Doha Round of trade negotiations. The evaluation is part of an established IFPRI practice of commissioning external evaluations of aspects of its work program.

In discussions with the Director General of IFPRI, it was agreed that the scope of this evaluation should be confined to that part of IFPRI's research most directly relevant to the WTO's Doha negotiations, notwithstanding the considerable volume of IFPRI research on national and regional trade policies and on commodity specific trade issues. 'On-balance' judgments have been needed to define the precise boundaries of IFPRI's Doha-relevant work for this project. A considerable body of IFPRI research has been conducted on subjects directly relevant to the Doha negotiations, in the lead-up to the launch in 2001 and during the negotiating process of around seven years since that time. I have erred on the side of also including related research which may be tangential to the negotiations per se but which I considered sufficiently relevant to Doha negotiating positions adopted by WTO members. This broader research material includes analyses of the policies supporting agriculture (producer support estimates or PSEs) in some developing countries; research into the impact of various trade policy changes in select developing countries, some of IFPRI's work on SPS and other regulatory barriers to agricultural trade; analysis and proposals for reform of some developed-country agricultural policies and research into the impact of China's accession to the WTO.

The broad remit for this evaluation set out by IFPRI was that it should include:

1. comprehending the *outputs* from the work, including research and capacity building;
2. developing a *conceptual framework* for assessing the impact of the set of activities;
3. tracing the *influences* of the outputs of the program, including the influences on agendas of international, regional, and national actors;
4. identifying *policy responses* and other effects generated by these outputs and assessed outcomes;
5. measuring the ultimate *impacts* in qualitative and quantitative terms where feasible;
6. drawing *lessons* for IFPRI as a learning organization aimed at improving the potential for future impact from programs of this nature and in general; and
7. clearly identifying the international public goods that the program has produced.

The study was also to involve:

- contacting and interviewing partners and stakeholders (including policy makers) to elicit their perceptions of the influence and value of the program and their associated follow-ups; and
- gathering other data relevant to assessing how the program made a difference, what changes were rendered in policy dialogue and decision, including analyses of influences via the media.

The Structure of the Report

This report has been set out as follows:

This first Section outlines the structure and content of the Report.

Section II, entitled “Agricultural Trade Liberalization and Development: IFPRI’s Role”, aims to provide some contextual background to IFPRI’s mandate and work in the pre-Doha period on agricultural trade liberalization and its implications for developing countries.

Section III, entitled “IFPRI’s Work on Agricultural Trade Liberalization and Links to Doha”, consists of a comprehensive documentation and discussion of IFPRI’s “outputs” relevant to the Doha negotiations including research materials ranging from books, chapters in books, discussion papers, journal articles, research briefs, conference papers, and less formal materials prepared for the media or public presentations. An attempt is made to relate these research outputs to the Doha negotiations as they have evolved over the period. This Section of the Report also describes IFPRI’s program of training and capacity-building activities for select developing countries relevant to agricultural trade negotiations.

Section IV of the Report called “Valuing IFPRI’s Doha Work: Challenges and Approaches”, presents a short discussion of difficulties involved in measuring the impact of policy research. The problems are especially acute in the field of global analysis involving very large numbers of actors in a negotiating process conducted over several years with even further delays in implementation before tangible outcomes can be assessed. This Section outlines the approach taken to assessing impact in the Report as a whole, includes reference to the full list of research materials and capacity-strengthening activities that are considered for the evaluation.

Section V, entitled “Views of Key Stakeholders on IFPRI’s Work on the Doha Negotiations”, draws together the results of a very extensive sampling of views of IFPRI partners and stakeholders about the relevance, quality, and influence of the outputs considered as part of this evaluation. A central tool for this part of the evaluation was a web-based survey designed to elicit quantitative and qualitative assessments from respondents about IFPRI’s work (Survey questions are reproduced at Appendix I and the list of respondents, identified by position and presented according to target group is at Appendix II)

The same survey questions were included, along with wider ranging discussion, in personal interviews conducted by telephone or in person with a significant number of the respondents. Target groups approached for comment included leading academic researchers in the field of agricultural trade liberalization and development, senior government policy advisors and negotiators directly involved in the Doha round, senior staff of think tanks, research institutions and nongovernment organizations, senior staff of the WTO and other international organizations involved in agricultural trade and development, and relevant expert staff of business and legal firms. Personal interviews took place in Washington DC, Geneva, and Paris. Some 114 targeted respondents were approached for comment and results are reported from 81. The results are analyzed and interpreted, including by category of respondent.

Section VI, entitled “IFPRI’s Research in Citations and Media Reporting”, presents and comments on the results of an extensive search of citation databases, media monitoring, and website downloads of the IFPRI research covered by this evaluation as well as some

comparisons with downloads and citations for similar research from the World Bank and the Carnegie Endowment.

Section VII, entitled “Illustrating Pathways to Influence from IFPRI’s Doha Research” elaborates on some of the material from earlier parts of the Report, providing more detailed case study narratives of research with high impacts. Section VIII, entitled “Conclusions and Lessons for the Future”, offers some comment on the overall “value for money” of IFPRI’s Doha work, including its potential international public good value.

This Section of the Report also makes recommendations, based on the findings of the evaluation as a whole, on how IFPRI might enhance further the impact of its work in this and other program areas.

II. AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT: IFPRI'S ROLE

Mandate for and Influences on IFPRI's Trade-Related Research and Activities

International agricultural trade issues have figured in IFPRI's work program since the organization's inception in 1975 and were consciously identified among the objectives articulated for the newly established Institute by Dale Hathaway, its first Director, as

“ to determine and publicize those actions which could be undertaken, and those policies which could be adopted by governments, regional and international agencies, to effect a continued increase in the quantity and quality of food supplies available to all people—through enhanced food production, *wider trade opportunities*, and improved efficiency and equity in food distribution”
(Hathaway 2005)

Trade-related research has continued throughout IFPRI's history, although the resources devoted to this work have waxed and waned over the years both with the rhythm of international trade negotiating activity and with the varying emphasis placed on agricultural market and trade reforms in national development programs. At times, also, research on trade liberalization has been seen as controversial. In a history of IFPRI's first decade the author, Curt Farrar, notes some tension between players within IFPRI and others in the wider CGIAR network about the relevance of IFPRI work on international trade, especially where it led to conclusions which were critical of the agricultural support and protection policies of donor countries (Farrar 2000).

The balance in IFPRI's research agenda between global and economy-wide analyses of agricultural trade issues and more micro-level country and commodity analyses has varied over time, as has the extent to which IFPRI has developed and maintained in-house modeling capability as a tool for this area of its research.

The record shows, nevertheless, that over the years, IFPRI's management has pursued a substantial volume of trade-related research, seeing it as directly relevant to IFPRI's vision as currently articulated of “a world free of hunger and malnutrition” and its mission in pursuit of this vision focuses on

- identifying and analyzing alternative international, national, and local policies in support of improved food security and nutrition, emphasizing low-income countries and poor people and the sound management of the natural resource base that supports agriculture;
- Contributing to capacity strengthening of people and institutions in developing countries that conduct research on food, agriculture and nutrition policies; and
- Actively engaging in policy communications, making research results available to those in a position to apply or use them, and carrying out dialogues with those users to link research and policy action”

(IFPRI's Strategy: Toward food and nutrition security, 2007)

The same document outlines the themes for IFPRI's work to which it accords weights and directions for level of effort. In this categorization, IFPRI's trade work falls into both Focus Area A on the efficient and fair functioning of global and national food and agriculture systems. Within this Focus Area, work on globalization, trade and markets is accorded only a low budget weighting and as at 2007, this allocation was expected to be maintained. Some trade-related activity is also carried out under Focus Area B on effective strategies and governance at the global, regional, and national levels through the governance and policy processes research theme which is also accorded a low budget weighting but an increase in effort level was anticipated. Much of IFPRI's trade related activity occurs in the Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division (MTID) but some trade-related country or issue-specific work is conducted in other parts of the organization, particularly the Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD). The current structure reflects changes to IFPRI's structure which were made in 2003 with the major trade functions moving from the Trade and Macroeconomics Division to the new MTID and broader economic analysis functions moving to the new DSGD. (Current and pre-2004 IFPRI organization charts are included at Appendix III)

With IFPRI's commitment to analytical rigor and an established emphasis on peer-review scrutiny, it should be no surprise that broadly speaking its trade-related research has fallen comfortably within the mainstream perspectives of the agricultural economics profession. Having said that, and as will emerge from the discussion below on pre-Doha research influences and in the following Section which deals in detail with IFPRI's Doha related activities, the orientation in IFPRI's trade research strongly reflects the organization's focus on food security and poverty reduction.

In framing and conducting its trade work, IFPRI has had an advantage in being able to tap a depth of research capability encompassing knowledge of the agricultural sectors of a large number of developing countries, including some of the smallest and poorest. Its network of field offices Addis Ababa, Abuja, Beijing, Dakar, Kampala, New Delhi, and San Jose, its links with developing-country governments and research institutions and expert staff and collaborators from developing countries have all helped to bring a richness and nuance to IFPRI's analysis of global trade liberalization. Its headquarters location in Washington DC provides highly productive links with the global international financial institutions as well as access to perhaps the world's most vibrant policy advocacy community and media hub. IFPRI's internationally diverse Board and its close association with the other elements of the CGIAR network all constitute assets for information gathering and influence.

From its earliest work through to its most recent, IFPRI has been attentive to the differences in agricultural production and trade profiles of different developing countries. Some of its most influential work has combined broad analysis of global impacts of trade liberalization with detailed assessments of impacts in particular developing countries or regions. While there is a general pre-disposition in most of IFPRI's research favoring openness and market-orientation over interventions and distortions in policy prescription, its analysts have not shied away from reporting negative consequences for particular countries or (especially vulnerable, low income) groups within countries, even where broader net positive benefits are identified. As a consequence, IFPRI research on trade reform has frequently been directed to its likely impacts on poverty and income distribution. It has also emphasized the importance of "complementary policies" to accompany trade reforms including in areas such as domestic market reforms in

agriculture and the wider economy, provision of infrastructure to support efficient agriculture initiatives, health, education and targeted social interventions.

By comparison, the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group Review (2006) concluded the Bank's trade policy advice in the period up to about 2004 had not sufficiently emphasized these factors and had tended to adopt a "one size fits all" approach. These issues have been given heightened attention more recently and indeed The Bank has made a significant contribution in this area, as reflected for example in the rich harvest of materials published in 2006. Particularly relevant in this context was a substantial volume of papers on poverty and the Doha agenda edited by Hertel and Winters but two other Doha-related World Bank volumes, one of which includes contributions from IFPRI research, also helped set this criticism to rest (Anderson and Martin 2006; Newfarmer 2006). A clear exposition of the World Bank's latest thinking on the heterogeneity of developing-country experiences under trade liberalization is provided in the latest World Development Report which states bluntly that "there will be losers across and within developing countries" and devotes considerable attention to spelling out the reasons and broad likely outcomes. Again, IFPRI research is included in the references cited for the trade chapter of this publication (World Development Report 2008).

Key Influences and IFPRI Outputs in the Pre-Doha Period

To provide some context for the main focus of this Report on the Doha negotiations, the following attempts to provide a brief review of the evolution of IFPRI's work on multilateral trade reform through to 1999 when work on resumed multilateral trade negotiations on agriculture got under way through the WTO.

The Case for Liberalization to Tackle the Bias against Agriculture

IFPRI's trade-related work during the late 1970s and 1980s was done against the backdrop of concerns on the part of development economists generally about the inefficiencies of import substitution strategies and the bias against agriculture implicit in the policies, including exchange rate policies, of many developing countries. Influential studies by Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1970) and Balassa (1971) stimulated a major focus on liberalization in adjustment lending programs at the World Bank to enhance economic efficiency by fostering openness in economic policy. Work by Krueger, Baghwati, and others reinforced these findings which were further elaborated after Krueger's appointment in 1986 as Chief Economist at the World Bank. This approach was paralleled by work on developing country policies at IFPRI championed by Alberto Valdes which drew on experience in Latin America and Africa and subsequently other countries including the Philippines and Pakistan. The research by Valdes and others at IFPRI ultimately led to the publication of a book called "The Bias Against Agriculture: Trade and macroeconomic policies in developing countries" which made the case for better functioning agricultural markets and reduced trade distortions to foster growth and reduce poverty (Bautista and Valdes 1993). Valdes also played a leading part in collaborative work in this area between IFPRI and the World Bank as reflected in the very substantial five volume comparative study series called "The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy" which had a powerful impact on thinking in the profession and in the policies of the international financial institutions as well as member governments (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 1992).

IFPRI trade research during this period also tackled the implications of developed-country agricultural policies on the welfare and food security of developing countries. A landmark IFPRI Research Report by Valdes and Zeitz in 1980 used a model constructed at IFPRI to show the implications for a range of developed and developing countries of reductions in OECD country protection of agriculture. Further work on this subject using more recent data was commissioned from IFPRI by the World Bank in 1985 and the Bank's World Development Report of 1986 drew extensively on IFPRI research in its arguments for agricultural trade liberalization in the interests of both developed and developing countries.

IFPRI produced a body of work directly relevant to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations around the time of their launch in 1986 and during the long period of the negotiations. IFPRI's conclusions continued to favor greater openness for developing-country agriculture, but its research also argued for "special and differential" provisions to take account of the circumstances of low-income and chronic food-deficit countries and those affected by preference erosion. A more substantial research effort and direct engagement in the debate about reform of the global agricultural trade framework at that time was probably attributable to the OECD which in 1987 achieved a commitment to market-oriented reform from Ministers of its member governments and launched its Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) methodology for measuring trends in support along with its annual policy monitoring reports which have continued since the (OECD 2007). Nevertheless, IFPRI certainly made a contribution. Increasingly also, IFPRI work, for example, an occasional paper on regional trade prospects in southern Africa by Valdes and Muir-Leresche (1993) focused on the broader national market reforms and accompanying policies that were needed for developing countries to take advantage of greater market access opportunities.

After some efforts by the key research institutions to assess the impacts of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) following its conclusion in 1994 (notably Martin and Winters 1996) attention to global agricultural trade liberalization at IFPRI and other key institutions dropped away somewhat until toward the end of the decade. There are logical explanations for this, including the hiatus in multilateral trade negotiations necessary to allow the full implementation of the Uruguay Round outcome to be played out. Another significant factor following the conclusion of NAFTA in 1993 was a heightened interest in both developed and developing countries in regional and bilateral trade agreements. At the World Bank, for example, the World Bank IEG Report (2006) notes a decline in emphasis on analytical work and lending on trade from the mid 1990s until a reappraisal and intensification of focus occurred in about 2001.

Debate about further steps in agricultural trade liberalization got under way by the late 1990s in the WTO as called for under the "continuation clause", or Article 20, of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. As preparations got under way for the ill-fated Seattle Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 1999 discussion intensified about an appropriate focus for what was then being called the "Millennium Round" of trade negotiations. (A time line of key events relevant to the Doha negotiations is provided at Appendix IV.)

New Challenges to Liberalization in Agriculture

The broad consensus among economists continued to support openness and reduction of trade-related distortions as important elements of pro-growth strategies for developing as well as

developed countries. Much had been achieved in the reform of trade policy settings in developing countries but some reform fatigue had emerged in the wake of the financial crises which unfolded from 1998 in a number of the more open Asian and Latin American economies. At the same time, a broad range of nongovernment organizations active in development, labor and environmental debates adopted a distinctly negative view of the impact of further trade liberalization.

The reasons for this spike in anti-globalization sentiment were many and varied. Part of the explanation lay in a natural sympathy for those likely to be displaced at least in the short term, by the process of “creative destruction” involved in adjustment to new competitive conditions, particularly in developing countries where poverty and food security were part of the picture. There was also some justified support for the view that the achievements of the Uruguay Round had been oversold. Developed countries were seen to have been let off the hook lightly when it became clearer that only relatively modest new market access opportunities had emerged for developing countries and continuing high levels of support for agriculture had been permitted for developed-country farm sectors despite some reductions in the degree of distortion in the nature of that support. Moreover, developing countries had come to appreciate the complex challenge and transition costs involved in managing deeper integration into the global economy and struggled with limited capacity to take advantage of the opportunities presented through their WTO membership.

Another strand in the anti-trade debate was environmental, with WTO dispute action¹ triggering concern about what some saw as the excessive reach of the WTO’s rules to regulation by domestic authorities.

On the labor front, adjustment and dislocation in traditional industries of developed countries in the face of the burgeoning competitiveness of emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere, led to allegations of unfair competition, or “social dumping” in European parlance, and was associated with NAFTA and other regional and bilateral trade agreements as well as multilateral trade liberalization.

Finally, following the adoption of work in the WTO on investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation at the Singapore Conference in 1996, those who were cautious about an expanding remit for liberalization at the global level had a broader set of issues for concern. As well as uncertainty about the possible implications for global disciplines in these new areas on national governments, the rapid expansion of WTO membership after 1995 generated a sense of “overload” for many smaller developing-country members with limited expert capability. Tensions around intellectual property disciplines, including their link to concerns about access to medicines in developing countries, also played a part.

¹ The EU/US beef hormone ruling of 1997 and the United States/India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand shrimp/turtle ruling in 1998.

The attention of international institutions and researchers turned more consciously to these issues as debate swirled around about a suitable agenda for a new round of global trade negotiations. Debate and drama was destined to persist, however, throughout the course of the Doha negotiations and the following Section of this Report documents and discusses IFPRI's work against the background of debates and disputes over the scenarios advanced by different parties for the Doha round.

III. IFPRI'S WORK ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LINKS TO DOHA

This Section focuses on the key subject of the Report, that is, the evolution of the Doha negotiations and IFPRI's Doha-related research outputs from 1999 through to the collapse in negotiations of July 2008, and relates this work to the issues under debate in the trade negotiations. As noted in the Introduction, the Report includes some work which is relevant but not directly Doha-related. A complete list of IFPRI research materials reviewed for the Report in each of the years from 1999–2008 is provided in Appendix V. The research materials could be seen as falling into three broad categories. The first group covers global impact assessments, often using CGE modeling, of the likely impacts of various Doha scenarios. The second group of materials assesses more specific issues in the negotiations of particular interest to developing countries such as food security, special and differential treatment provisions and broader issues like food safety and SPS barriers. The third category includes a disparate range of research on the effects of agricultural liberalization in particular countries or affecting particular commodities. Much of this latter category is focused on developing countries or regions (including India, Mexico, the Philippines, the Near East and North Africa, China, and others) but some deals with the implications of changes in developed country agricultural support and protection, for example, a significant stream of work on the U.S. Farm Bill.

A more systematic effort to assess the impact of IFPRI's Doha work is made in the next Section of the Report, which also includes the results of survey and interview responses from key stakeholders. In this Section, however, the focus is on the highlights of what was produced and the relevance of IFPRI's trade work to the Doha agenda.

Discussion of the issues in this Section has been organized around what I have identified as distinct milestones in the negotiations. A more detailed time line of key events in the Doha process is provided at Appendix IV, but the discussion here is divided into five phases with the staging points being:

- issues elaboration and launch of the Doha Round,
- early negotiations then the breakdown in Cancun,
- achievement of the 'July Framework Agreement' in August 2004,
- suspension of Doha negotiations in July 2006, and
- resumption of work on a modalities text and efforts to complete the Doha negotiations.

Launching a New Multilateral Trade Round—1999 to 2002

Negotiations on further steps in agricultural trade liberalization were mandated to resume by late 1999 or early 2000 under the terms of Article 20 (the "continuation clause") of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) but most had anticipated better prospects for success if agriculture could be included as part of a more comprehensive negotiating round. A great deal of focus was therefore given to articulating the scope and focus of possible new negotiations, which were generally referred to as a "Millennium Round" but from the outset, agriculture was seen as the central element.

The previous section of this Report noted the emergence of and some of the reasons for critical attitudes towards further trade liberalization in the lead-up to the December 1999 Seattle Conference. Following the surprise collapse of that meeting the attention of international institutions and researchers returned more consciously to these issues. IFPRI, like others, played its part. In the WTO itself, proposals were submitted by members (126 members contributed to some 45 proposals) and “Special Sessions” then, later, more formal meetings of the Agriculture Committee were held in the search for a consensus about the scope and objectives of new negotiations. Proposals from some members and groups were comprehensive, covering inter alia the three pillars of the URAA (market access, domestic support and export competition) and others dealt with more specific issues such as food safety and quality, nontrade concerns, state trading enterprises, and animal welfare. Proposals from developing countries often concentrated on food security and aspects of special and differential treatment provisions that were sought to moderate developing-country liberalization commitments. (A list of the proposals received in 2000 and 2001 is included in a background document on the WTO website.) Positions put forward by different groups of members were widely at variance.

With hindsight, perhaps the struggles which later ensued in the negotiations might have been better anticipated. As preparations for the Doha Conference took place the United States was heavily engaged in its “competitive liberalization” process of bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements and early preparations for the 2002 Farm Bill did not suggest a more liberal outcome was likely to emerge. The EU was pre-occupied with its enlargement agenda and a complex and difficult internal process of agriculture policy reform. It was clear from the outset that Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform would focus more on re-instrumentation of domestic support to reduce its distortive effects than on border measure reforms that might have accorded significant new global market access opportunities. A distraction from the liberalization agenda also was the EU’s focus on ‘non-trade concerns’ aimed at seeking a higher level of intellectual property protection for its traditional agricultural products and processes.

While the perspectives of the two major WTO members, the US and the EU, had in previous trade rounds had very significant sway over the ultimate outcomes, in the post-Uruguay Round period the number of developing country members in the negotiating process had grown dramatically and as was to become evident, would have an unprecedented impact on the way negotiations unfolded. In the case of the new developing country members, however, many had limited capacity to devote to the negotiations in Geneva and capitals and as noted above, an increasingly “defensive” position from them on new commitments was emerging.

The Doha negotiations were launched, nevertheless, at the November 2001 Ministerial Conference in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks and at a time of graver concern than usual in the international community about the future of an interconnected world. The negotiating mandate was surprisingly ambitious in tone, coverage, and timeframes for negotiation. It also paid heightened attention to development issues, through explicit agreement to special and differential provisions but also through repeated textual references to issues of development concern like food security and rural development. Indeed from this point the negotiations also came to be known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). As was later to become clear, the Doha mandate papered over sharp differences in both scope and ambition within the membership, including among developing countries. Ernesto Zedillo provides

insightful commentary on the tensions between the language of the Doha mandate and the prospects of delivering it. This has been evident in the extended stop-start rhythm of the negotiations (Zedillo 2007).

IFPRI's Outputs—1999 to 2002

The picture that emerges from IFPRI's work in this period is that of an organization attuned to tensions in the negotiating environment and focused consciously on the development implications of competing approaches to a trade round.² In addition to the research outputs on global trade negotiations, it is clear from internal IFPRI Internal Program Review documents that the organization was active in outreach to governments and nongovernment development groups in this period with frequent staff involvement in briefings, conferences, and seminars with a broad range of interested parties.

Some useful descriptive pieces were published on the issues at stake and the significance of the negotiations for development, picking up on discussions about the inclusion of a “development box” in the new agreement. The strands of this work were drawn together in the IFPRI discussion paper by Diaz-Bonilla, Robinson, Thomas, and Yanoma (2002). An important conclusion in this work was the great heterogeneity of circumstances among the developing-country membership of the WTO and the need for objective means of distinguishing their situations. A major contribution was made to the emerging debate in the WTO membership about the provisions that might be included in the Doha text to take account of the development needs of members, and particularly those related to food security in this and related work (Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2002; Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2000; Diaz-Bonilla and Thomas 2001; and Diaz-Bonilla, Robinson, and Thomas 2002). Using some innovative cluster analysis, IFPRI took a clear-headed look at food-insecurity issues which were being debated in the WTO and made a compelling case for careful distinction between countries which are food insecure and those that are net food importers but might not be food insecure; the research also offered useful advice about the most appropriate ways to tackle this serious question in the negotiations, concluding that broad-based exemptions from commitments might not be the most productive approach. While embracing the merits of developing countries being given some scope to deal with exceptional import surges, IFPRI cautioned against the damaging impacts of protection on food in developing countries.

Under the guidance of the then Director of the Trade and Macroeconomics Division, Sherman Robinson, resources were committed to the construction of a CGE model that would enable IFPRI to produce impact assessments of competing trade liberalization scenarios. An example of the modeling work from this period, using GTAP 5 data, was published in the *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* (Diao, Roe, and Somwaru 2002) and focused on the distorting impact of OECD policies on global agricultural markets. In an early expression of the thrust of IFPRI's impact assessments of later years, this research drew attention to the mixed impact of reforms on food security of developing countries but noted positive welfare gains for developing countries in the long run.

² Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, who made a major contribution to IFPRI's trade work in this period, actually attended the Seattle Conference.

Negotiations Gather Pace Ahead of the Setback in Cancun—2002 to 2003

A cracking pace of three years to completion was set for the Doha negotiations and informal discussion on technical and specific proposals took place in Geneva in an effort to achieve a modalities text by March 2003 for consideration at the Cancun Ministerial Conference in September 2003. There was little sign, though, of coalescence around a consensus approach and the Chair of the Agriculture negotiations, Stuart Harbinson, made repeated calls for members to come together on the key issues. His lengthy overview document, circulated to WTO members in December 2002 (WTO document TN/AG/6), lists positions of members on all the issues and in the absence of movement from the parties, the Chair issued his own text in February (First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments”, WTO document TN/AG/W/1) and produced a revised version of it in March 2003. Harbinson’s efforts were rebuffed, particularly by some developed-country members who did not accept the ambition implicit in his proposed market access modalities which incorporated a “banded” tariff formula aimed at tackling tariff peaks and escalation. In response to the intense food security and “development box” debate in preceding months, Harbinson had also introduced “special product” provisions for developing countries where food security, rural development and livelihood security were at stake. Members’ positions remained polarized, however, as the March 2003 deadline was missed and even after further technical discussions in Geneva through to the middle of the year. Doha appeared at risk of stalemate as the Cancun date approached.

At one of many informal “mini-Ministerial” meetings, this time in Montreal in July 2003, key members seemed ready to consider compromise and in response to suggestions from participants at Montreal, the US and EU agreed to work bilaterally on a breakthrough proposal. Their perspectives, especially on market access, were far apart at that point and it was hoped that if these two major members could reach an agreement, it might be suitable for wider adoption.

The US and EU released a draft “framework” paper in August 2003 covering some of the key issues and proposing a new “blended formula” for tariff cuts. Somewhat surprisingly, given the development focus of the previous months’ discussions, the US/EU text was silent on special and differential treatment issues. As with the Harbinson text, criticism of the details came from many quarters but a particularly sharp reaction emerged from the newly formed G20 developing country-only group which included Brazil, India, and China as key members. The broad thrust of their rejection lay in the view that in both market access and domestic support, the two majors were proposing insufficient liberalization from developed countries to meet the terms of the Doha mandate. The text’s attempt to differentiate between developing countries by denying special and differential treatment to competitive net food exporters added fuel to the fire. (The G20 response was re-circulated as a WTO ministerial conference document, WT/MIN [03] W/6). In the limited time remaining before Cancun, the chair of the General Council, Carlos Perez del Castillo, chose to incorporate much of the content of the US/EU text into the draft Cancun ministerial declaration. This, in turn, was largely incorporated into the revised draft presented to the Conference by Mexican Foreign Minister, Louis Derbez.

The Cancun Conference had been intended as an important step on the path to completion of the Doha Round but in the event some of the atmospherics of the earlier Seattle Conference re-emerged, including the presence in the surrounding area of many protesters. Within the Conference itself, the mood was tense with many developing countries, encouraged by a large

NGO presence, objecting to parts of the draft declaration. In meetings between delegations and groups outside the formal sessions it was evident that large gaps existed over the agriculture text but even stronger objections were registered to the incorporation of the four “Singapore issues”. Another prominent focal point for discontent came from a newly coordinated group of African developing countries (“the Cotton Four”—Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) who, with strong support from development groups, were calling for accelerated action to remove distortions caused by developed-country policies on world cotton markets.

The agriculture text was never formally negotiated at Cancun and while there was some preliminary debate about removing some of the Singapore issue language from the draft declaration, in the end the meeting ended without result.

IFPRI’s Outputs—2002 to 2003

During the period between the Seattle and Cancun conferences IFPRI’s focus turned more deliberately to the Doha round and its development implications. More than had generally been the case in the past, IFPRI research was published in the form of briefings and newsletters, both in IFPRI’s own series of materials (Diaz-Bonilla, Orden, and Thomas 2003; Watkins and von Braun 2003; Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson 2003) and in conjunction with other actors in the debate such as the increasingly influential Bridges newsletter and the World Economic Forum (von Braun, Grote, and Wobst 2002; Diaz-Bonilla 2002).

Proceedings from conference and discussion sessions also figured prominently at this time (Diaz-Bonilla 2003; Orden and Taylor 2003) suggesting the organization placed a high priority on being heard on the issues under direct consideration in the negotiating process. The thrust of IFPRI’s arguments in this work was to underline the damaging impact of OECD agricultural distortions on agriculture in many developing countries, calling for further big steps with this “unfinished business” and acknowledging the need for special attention to impacts on the situation of poor producers. IFPRI’s work, however, continued to make the case for developing countries themselves to avoid policies which would continue the “bias against agriculture” in their economies, with Diaz-Bonilla suggesting developing countries resist the temptation to adopt defensive positions in the negotiations, except through targeted and limited measures, noting that more broad based exemptions for developing countries to allow for higher and permanent protection for food products “most likely worsens the plight of the poor, who are basically net buyers of food” (p.113).

IFPRI also continued to produce its more usual analytical reports during this period, many of which had a strong focus on the development and poverty implications of agricultural trade liberalization, such as the well-timed piece by Minot and Daniels. Further reference will be made to this and associated IFPRI work, but it should be noted here that IFPRI’s initiative to analyze with such care the negative impact of the U.S. cotton program on world cotton prices, and in turn on marginalized farmers in a small central African country, provided a good example of high quality, high impact research which proved to be extremely well timed given the focus on cotton in Cancun and afterwards (Minot and Daniels 2002).

Turning attention in a different way to the damaging impact of developed-country policies on the interests of agricultural producers in developing countries, and targeting debate about the U.S. Farm Bill which many saw as sending a negative signal about the seriousness of Washington’s

ambitious positioning in Doha, David Orden produced a valuable piece in 2002 and would return to this theme in various ways in the following years (Orden 2002).

Other analytical contributions were produced tackling issues of broad interest such as the interplay between multilateral and regional trade liberalization (Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2003). A major stream of work was also conducted in conjunction with the Danish Research Institute of Food Economics which was later published by that organization.

Overall in this period IFPRI's work outputs reflect a significant effort was being made to contribute effectively to the vigorous debate taking place among governments, development groups and other commentators about an appropriate course for the Doha negotiations.

Achieving the July Framework Agreement—Late 2003 to August 2004

For six months after the Cancun setback there were no formal negotiating sessions at the WTO and talks were described as “temporarily discontinued” rather than suspended. Much quiet activity took place in the margins between the most active parties, including through meetings and position development on the part of the newly formed developing-country groups, the G20 (in which Brazil and India took the most prominent roles) and the more defensive G33 (in which Indonesia and the Philippines were prominent and which focused especially on the special products issue). The two majors, after a short period of reflection, re-entered the fray with a call for resumption by USTR, Bob Zoellick, in January 2004 with the agenda pared back to agriculture, services and industrial goods. Key ministers and the WTO Director General invested much time and travel in rescue efforts, meeting in locations as far flung as Dakar, Sao Paolo, and Paris in the following months. The EU made a significant contribution in May 2004 to keeping the process alive with a conditional offer to set a date for the elimination of export subsidies, seen by many agricultural exporting countries an essential, if not sufficient, condition for an agreement.

A considerable amount of dialogue took place quietly in Geneva and other capitals, at both senior official and Ministerial level in this period, in a group which came to be known as the “Five Interested Parties” or “FIPS”, consisting of the US, the EU, Brazil, India, and Australia. This grouping reflected the reality now evident in the Doha process that an outcome could not be reached without consensus in agriculture and that developing countries would play a more decisive part. Brazil's heavy investment in its work in the G20, along with India and others, while giving only modest emphasis to its Cairns Group membership, marked a key change in dynamic for the negotiation overall. Equally, India's inclusion in a key brokering group of this kind demonstrated its more active engagement in the negotiations and arguably some shift from its previously extremely cautious approach to agricultural liberalization. The G10, including the developed countries with the highest levels of support and protection and the most conservative positions on reform such as Norway, Switzerland, Japan, and Israel, also continued to make their voices heard. At the same time, multiple and overlapped groups of members were active such as the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group (ACP) which was especially focused on the issue of preference erosion, the African group, concerned about a range of development issues including food security and vulnerable economy concerns, the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) which concentrated on special and differential treatment issues and technical assistance a recently-acceded members group calling for lesser obligations to facilitate their adjustment to membership and the Cairns Group with its focus on ambitious results, particularly market access.

(See the background document on the WTO website for a description and membership of the various negotiating groups.) The FIPS acted informally but continued to meet regularly through to the July 2004 meeting of key Ministers in Geneva. On occasion it also met in a smaller G4 format of the EU, US, Brazil, and India.

Meetings of the wider WTO membership resumed in March 2004 and in an interactive process led by the new chair of the agriculture negotiations, Tim Groser, key issues were crunched in numerous groupings and formats with the chair active in urging members to find a way forward but resisting the temptation to get too far in the lead. On more than one occasion, it appeared that the process might have to be abandoned but movement occurred in steps. Compromise outcomes eventually coalesced including around a package (outlined in brief later in this Section). After an all night session of some 30 delegations on 31 July 2004 a framework text covering agriculture and a pared back group of other issues was agreed and following consideration by the wider membership was circulated on 2 August 2004 (see WTO document WT/L/579).

IFPRI's Outputs—September 2003 to August 2004

A review of IFPRI's research outputs in this period seems to suggest some stepping back from the more energetic engagement it appeared to have made in the Doha negotiations in the previous period. Work continued on agricultural liberalization, and some material continued to be focused directly on the Doha negotiations such as von Braun, Gulati, and Orden's presentation to a WTO Public Symposium in Geneva in May 2004 (von Braun, Gulati, and Orden 2004).

Other work appeared on issues of considerable general interest to those interested in agricultural trade liberalization and development such as David Orden's contribution to a highly regarded work with Josling and Roberts on food regulatory issues (Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004; Roberts, Josling, and Orden 2004). Further work was published on the food security theme tackled prominently by Diaz-Bonilla in the previous period (Díaz-Bonilla, Thomas, and Robinson 2004). Another significant stream of work was begun in this period on estimations of producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) for key developing countries, with early results for India and China appearing a little later (Mullen et al. 2004) useful detailed analysis of the implications of China's WTO accession was produced by Diao, Agapi, and Francis (2003) and Diao, Fan, and Zhang (2003).

So while trade work continued to receive attention and valuable work was in train, whether consciously or not, the focus of IFPRI's outputs seem to move away at least somewhat from the cut and thrust of the Doha negotiation issues. Part of the explanation may lie in staff changes and organizational reorganization which took place in this period with the establishment of a new Division (the Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division [MTID]). A reading of the new Division's first report on achievements and plans at the end of 2004, however, does seem to reflect a more methodologically oriented approach to research, with its focus on producing insights into questions which might have longer-term relevance, such as the PSE studies of India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, and a significant new stream of research on South Asian country studies than some of the more negotiation focused research subjects of the immediately earlier period. Other priorities at IFPRI, and particularly those associated with the attention given in the CGIAR network's Science Council at the time to national market development issues like high

value production and diversification, may also have had the effect of reducing the attention accorded to trade work.

Along with development advocacy groups, other international organizations were lifting their attention to Doha at this time, with the World Bank in particular making considerable efforts to highlight the issues at stake for developing countries. Some criticisms of the Bank's lack of attention to differential impacts in different developing countries was sharpest in relation to statements made at this period, and Panagariya is particularly blunt in remarks about what he calls "fallacies" articulated by the Bank's leadership (though not, he says by the Bank's research staff) (Panagariya 2005). Putting those arguments to one side, what seems clear is a different assessment by the two organizations about the importance of engaging in the unfolding debate about agricultural liberalization and development playing out through the somewhat embattled Doha negotiations.

Stumbling Blocks in the Search to Define Modalities—August 2004 to July 2006

The so-called July Framework Agreement set the broad parameters within which the detail of the final Doha modalities would be determined through further specification, hoped for by the December 2005 Hong Kong Conference of the WTO. More than the Doha Mandate of 2001, the July 2004 framework text consciously reflected the limits to the level of ambition in a final agreement in circumstances where wide disparities in positions remained. Key elements were as follows.

On market access, the most difficult of the pillars given the differences in views of members, the Framework adopted what was called a tiered approach to tariff reductions with progressive cuts within the tiers. Sensitive product provisions allowing lesser tariff cuts would be available to all members, so long as "substantial improvements" in access could be demonstrated, through the combination of tariff cuts and expansion. Special and differential treatment provisions broke new ground, with dispensation for developing countries from general commitments being allowed for special products "especially important for food security, livelihood security and rural development" and recourse was allowed to a new contingency measure called a special safeguard mechanism. Least-developed countries were exempted from reduction commitments and particular attention was to be given to tropical products, alternatives to illicit crops, preference erosion, and other development issues.

On domestic support, the Framework also embraced a progressive tiered approach and required cuts both to bound levels of Amber Box and de Minimis support and to overall trade-distorting support (OTDS) comprising Amber Box, de Minimis and Blue Box Support. Down payment cuts of 20 percent were required from bound levels (in response to concerns about the degree of binding overhang) and further product specific reductions would be required. New disciplines were introduced with a cap at 5 percent of production value for Blue Box measures but following vigorous argument from the U.S., some loosening of Uruguay Round definitions was foreshadowed. Green box definitions were to be reviewed. Developing countries were accorded gentler cuts over longer periods.

On export competition, the anticipated commitment to end all forms of export subsidies was given, by "a date to be agreed", new disciplines were outlined limiting the length of export credit

programs and some direction was provided for further negotiation on state trading enterprises and food aid.

Reflecting the heightened development focus of the negotiation, some broad new commitments were made with reference to special and differential treatment provisions being effective in practice, allowing developing countries to meet their needs, especially in food security and rural development. More unusually, however, commodity-specific language was introduced providing a commitment to address cotton issues “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically” with a sub-committee to be set up to work on cotton aspects of all pillars in the negotiation.

After this period of “negotiation to exhaustion,” the negotiations returned to more technical mode with sessions conducted generally monthly on the detailed definitional and other issues necessary to reach full agreement on modalities. A considerable amount of work was done on issues like the methodology to be used for establishing the ad valorem tariff equivalents of different forms of border protection. Although the July Framework had set a certain course for the final agreement, real tensions persisted over the final balance. Developing countries were looking for deep developed-country commitments in market access and domestic support but significant numbers of developing countries outside the LDC group were seeking broad exemptions from commitments on the grounds that developed countries had an obligation to move first. Equally, some of the agricultural exporting developing countries in the Cairns Group and G20 opposed dilution of the liberalizing impact of Doha by curtailing the expanded market access that could flow from south-south trade expansion, particularly into emerging economy markets. Most developing-country and Cairns Group members wanted to see deeper market access reductions than were favored by the EU and G10 and more far reaching domestic support cuts than the U.S. proposed. Other development issues also remained the subject of tensions.

The Cotton Sub-Committee mandated under the Framework agreement was established in November 2004, only weeks after a WTO Panel found in favor of Brazil in its case against U.S. cotton subsidies and the prospect of wider resort to dispute action was in the atmosphere. This increased the emphasis being placed by developing countries and nongovernmental development advocates on the priority they felt should be given to big cuts in developed-country support measures, to some extent overshadowing market access concerns notwithstanding evidence from World Bank and others about the relative importance of the two pillars. In addition, with the expiry of the “peace clause” at the end of 2003, there was a growing disposition to tackle grievances through dispute settlement action, especially on the domestic subsidy front where cases were being brought under the general WTO provisions on subsidies. Overall, as the December 2005 Ministerial Conference loomed there was real concern about the state of play and risk of another stalemate and the recently appointed chair of the negotiations, Crawford Falconer, had a huge task on his hands.

New proposals emerged from the US and the EU but the differences in emphasis remained, with the EU defensive on market access and the U.S. putting forward less far reaching domestic support cuts than key developing countries and some others were seeking. Just ahead of the Hong Kong Conference renewed attention was focused on the relative importance of the market access pillar compared with the other elements of the agriculture negotiation, with considerable interest and some controversy emerging from research released by the World Bank aimed at influencing the Hong Kong outcome (Newfarmer 2006). A key policy message from the World Bank was that market access was by far the most important element in the Doha outcome, that

tariff cuts had to be deep to be effective, that exclusions for sensitive products had to be limited, a tariff cap would help and that it was in the interests of all countries, especially the world's poor, for protection to be reduced in developing as well as high income countries.

Ultimately a package of understandings was pulled together at the Hong Kong Conference enabling the round to be declared “back on track” with a new deadline of April 2006 for modalities. Few concessions were made, however, and tensions persisted in the background over how a meaningful agreement could be reached. There was some modest elaboration of aspects of the Framework, and agreement on an end date of 2013 for the elimination of export subsidies was the centre piece. The Conference devoted much effort to development aspects of the negotiation which had not been resolved, notably on cotton and a duty free quota free (DFQF) access commitment under consideration for LDCs and new language was agreed on both issues, though on the latter with the U.S. and some others unwilling to make unconstrained commitments. Deep divisions persisted, however, on market access provisions.

Work resumed in 2006 but the going was hard. Chair Crawford Falconer released a new version of draft modalities in June 2006 (WTO document TNC/AG/W/3) which he acknowledged was not “an elegant document but a reflection of where we are” and noting that “there will never be any prospect of bridging differences if one does not have a sober and realistic view of them to begin with...”. This stark documentation of the persistent gaps on key issues was followed in June 2006 by a collapse of efforts towards agreement on modalities. Director General Lamy's announce a suspension of the negotiations in July 2006.

IFPRI's Outputs—August 2004 to July 2006

This period saw a progressive build up of IFPRI's research outputs related to Doha following a quieter 2004–2005 period as the new organizational structure was settled down and significant staff changeovers occurred in the Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division. A broadly positive external evaluation of IFPRI's trade economy-wide modeling work had been conducted by Kym Anderson during 2003 (Anderson 2003) but with the departure of Sherman Robinson and Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, who had led much of IFPRI's global trade analysis in the previous few years, IFPRI's in-house global CGE modeling capacity was effectively put on hold for a period.

Attention to global trade impact assessment work was revived with vigor, however, after the appointment of Senior Research Fellow, Antoine Bouët, in February 2005. He produced a significant article during that year along with French researchers Bureau, Decreux, and Jean from CEPII and INRA, which drew out sharp contrasts between developing countries in terms of the effects they would experience from global trade liberalization (Bouët et al. 2005). The authors challenged the excessively optimistic assessments of earlier mainstream CGE modeling of benefits to developing countries from trade liberalization included in widely cited World Bank research (World Bank 2004).

In what marked a significant breakthrough in the quality and detail of data used to simulate trade effects, and using the August 2004 Doha Framework agreement as a basis, the authors set out to improve the way existing agricultural trade distortions and circumstances were captured. They incorporated more precisely than had been done previously existing trade preferences, regional agreements, the gaps between applied and bound protection, more accurate assessment of specific rate tariffs, details of various domestic support measures and, importantly, they

distinguished between groups of developing countries through more precise specification of their agricultural production and trade profiles. While in many respects the modeling approach used by Bouët et al. paralleled other efforts, the significant improvement in data produced through their MACMap data base, led to a material reduction in estimation of welfare gains for developing countries, noting that some would actually experience a loss in welfare. The article acknowledged the impact on some developing countries of preference erosion and the possible damaging impact of agricultural price increases on some net food importing developing countries but argued that exemption from commitments by all developing countries was not an appropriate solution and that more targeted approaches should be adopted to deal with welfare losses in those developing countries so affected.

This work captured the attention of researchers and had a significant impact, not least through the decision in the following year by the GTAP consortium to incorporate the MACMaps data. It has been widely accepted and used in the profession since that time and has been valued for the precision and richness with which global trade distortions and developing-country agricultural economies have been represented. The MACMaps data incorporated into GTAP was used, for example, by the World Bank in studies conducted from 2005 and Anderson and Martin (2006) note that the new 6.05 version of the GTAP database “is a major improvement over the previous version for several reasons” A description of the MACMaps database was published in Bouët, Decreux, Fontagne, Jean, and Laborde in December 2004. During 2006, as negotiators struggled to agree on Doha modalities, further work was done by Bouët and others using the richer analytical material they had been developing to illuminate key issues at the heart of battles under way in Geneva.

In the wake of considerable interest in the reduced estimates of welfare gains for developing countries through Doha, Bouët produced a piece using the Mirage model and MACMap data on “opening the black box” which elaborated and explained clearly the reasons for the differences in outcomes among the best known modeling work, with the World Bank and others as reference cases (Bouët 2006a and 2006b). Consistent with IFPRI’s longstanding market orientation, Bouët nevertheless concluded that even though lower, estimated benefits from liberalization for developing countries were positive, and would be more so with appropriate complementary policies. Moreover, trade reform through Doha needed to be very ambitious to have a positive development impact, including through liberalization of agriculture in developing countries. A parallel exercise to explain the reasons behind differences in modeled assessments of Doha scenarios was also produced by the World Bank’s Dominique van der Mensbrugghe (2006) who identified similar factors to those cited by Bouët and others. Interestingly, since GTAP’s incorporation of the MACMap database, differences between modeled estimates of the impact of various Doha trade liberalization scenarios have narrowed appreciably.

While this work attracted considerable interest among researchers (see Section VI of this Report for supporting evidence through citations) and policy advisors who followed leading research, IFPRI’s attention also turned more directly to the negotiating environment at a time of growing anxiety about continuing drift and a sense that members were not prepared to bring much more to the table. Bouët, Mevel, and Orden produced two incisive pieces in research briefing format arguing for a more ambition in the negotiating outcome and calling for two specific improvements to developed-country offers which could have meaningful positive benefits for the poorest developing countries. The two proposed adjustments were for developed countries all to

commit to 100 percent duty free and quota free (DFQF) access for agricultural and manufacturing tariff lines for LDCs as proposed by the EU and for the number of sensitive and special products exempted from formula cuts to be limited to 1 percent as proposed by the U.S. (Bouët, Mevel, and Orden 2006a and 2006b).

This work saw IFPRI engaged at least as actively and directly in producing material aimed at influencing the Doha negotiations as it had been around the time of Cancun. Others too began to lift the level of their involvement with numerous contributions from the World Bank. A well-publicized study from the Carnegie endowment in March 2006 (Polaski 2006) lent support for the more defensive approach that had been adopted by many developing countries in the negotiations. This study generated intense interest in Geneva and from development advocacy groups.

In addition to the impact assessment work and commentary on negotiating options, several other noteworthy contributions on agricultural trade liberalization were produced by IFPRI in this period. Earlier work by Minot and Daniels (2005) on cotton and rural poverty in Benin was published in the *Journal of Agricultural Economics* and the approach used in that important research of linking global price adjustments with rural household survey data was adopted in further work by Orden, Salam, Dewina, Nazli, and Minot (2006). This study also showed dramatic positive results with an estimated reduction poverty in Pakistan of 1.939 million people from a 20 percent rise in cotton prices.

Other strands of IFPRI country-specific trade analysis warrant mention from this period. The first is work by Cororaton, Cockburn, and Corong on Doha scenarios, trade reforms, and poverty in the Philippines, which played to IFPRI's strengths in high quality assessment combining detailed knowledge of the agriculture sector of a specific country with global scenario assessment and maintaining a clear focus on poverty reduction (Cororaton, Cockburn, and Corong 2005; Cororaton and Cockburn 2006). While not so directly related to Doha, work by Diao and others on the implications and impact of China's WTO accession offered revealing insights relevant to China's involvement in the Doha process (Tuan, Somwaru, and Diao 2006; Zhang 2006). Similarly, work by Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005) on agricultural policies and PSE estimates for India produced a richly detailed understanding of Indian agricultural policies and challenges, relevant to understanding the more active role India was playing by this time in the Doha process.

In short, IFPRI was now reestablished as a significant contributor to Doha relevant research and was active both at the "real time" level of the negotiations at a highly precarious point in their evolution, and at the level of detailed research relevant to longer-term policy reform.

Resumption of Negotiations and Efforts to Finalize—August 2006 to July 2008

After a further hiatus in the negotiations, behind-the-scenes engagements between key players eventually facilitated the climate for a resumption of efforts to take Doha through to conclusion. Chair Crawford Falconer issued a "challenges paper" in April 2007 which contained some blunt messages for members about where the center of gravity might lie for a compromise agreement. He changed his arm at some breakthrough ideas on the most difficult elements of the negotiation, putting into words what most hard-headed observers and participants in the Doha round had privately acknowledged for a long time. In effect he was calling for the U.S. to offer more by

way of domestic subsidy cuts so as to commit to a cut to below its actual spending; for the EU, Japan, and others to agree to deeper tariff cuts, but at lesser levels than being called for by the G20; and for special and sensitive product and safeguard provisions to be resolved with more modest deviations from general formula cuts than being sought by major proponents. In a constructive contribution, Falconer also mused about the merits of developing countries abandoning some of the complex and difficult debate about special flexibilities of various sorts and reverting instead to a simple Uruguay Round average tariff cut approach along the lines of the suggestion put forward in the World Bank's pre-Hong Kong Conference publication. As noted in the influential *Bridges* publication (Volume 11, No. 152, May 2007), there had been circular argument in the months after the Hong Kong Conference played out mainly between the US, the EU, and India about who needed to move first to break the impasse on an achievable deal.

Failure at an informal meeting in Potsdam in June 2007 to crunch through a deal among the G4 (US, EU, Brazil, and India), with Australia and Japan (by then styled collectively the G6) in the wings, cast a bleak shadow but ultimately Falconer's efforts bore fruit as the negotiation resumed. By July 2007 he was able to release a further revised modalities draft. Negotiations once again moved into an intense phase with all alert to the time pressure associated with the U.S. electoral cycle. Developing countries were not persuaded by the chair's cut through suggestion about reverting to a simple tariff cut and the focus in Geneva, mainly through "Room E" meetings of a group of 37 delegations in which all the key negotiating groups were represented (US, EU, G20, G33, Cairns, Africa, ACP, small and vulnerable economies, Cotton-4, tropical products group, recent and new members). The critical issues in play were the same stumbling blocks that had stymied agreement from the outset. Key details of the tariff cutting formula, TRQ expansion, sensitive and special product and safeguard issues, trade distorting support formula cut details, blue box provisions, development flexibilities, cotton, and so on. The process continued at perhaps its most serious pace since the launch through the rest of 2007.

A further revised text was released in February 2008 (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.1) and subsequent negotiations made progress particularly on a framework for tariff rate quota expansion for sensitive products under the so-called "partial designation" approach allowing a limited number of tariff lines to be declared sensitive. Gaps in some other areas (especially on domestic support and export competition) were also narrowed but market access provisions for developing countries (Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism) remained difficult. Work was also still needed on tropical products and the tariff preference erosion issue.

Another revision of the modalities text was issued in May 2008 (TN/AG/W/4/Rev 2), putting the negotiations within sight of conclusion. The text was revised once again on 10 July 2008 ahead of a Ministerial-level meeting which began later that month. This time Falconer included additional detail on tariff and domestic support reductions, including more elaborated special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries which dealt with some of the most disputed issues such as tropical products and preference erosion. Specific provisions were also set out for an unprecedented number of groups of developing countries in response to their arguments for special exemptions from the general formulas. These included not only Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Recently Acceded Members (RAMs) but also a new group of Very Recently Acceded Members (VRAMs), Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), and

more. In some cases, competing versions of the text were also included to focus negotiators' attention on the remaining the gaps.

During the late July session, Director General Lamy worked closely with Chairs of negotiating groups and the General Council and a group of Ministers from seven actively involved members (Australia, Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, and the US) as well as a larger group of some 30 members in the Green Room format. Over nine days of intense negotiation these smaller groups reported almost daily to the full membership. On 25 July, Lamy had sufficient confidence that a deal could be brokered to put out an informal proposal which covered key outstanding issues in agriculture and NAMA. After some seven years and over 200 hours of formal negotiations the effort ultimately foundered, ostensibly over differences in the small group of seven members between the U.S. on one hand and India (with Chinese support) on the other over the degree of permissiveness for developing countries to raise tariffs in the event of import surges under the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). While agreement was close on most elements of the SSM provisions, the U.S. was not prepared to accept the possibility of pre-Doha tariff bindings being breached in the context of import surges while India insisted this was essential. It is likely that had the issue been debated in the fully membership, India would have garnered broader support from some other developing-country members while the U.S. position would likely have attracted support from other developed and developing members. In the wake of the failure on the SSM issue a small number of other matters still in dispute such as the treatment of cotton were not formally broached. Nevertheless, of over a hundred critical issues of difference between members at the start of the last phase of negotiations it was surprising to many observers that the process collapsed on a relatively minor aspect of only one of these issues.

Unlike the situation after the failed Cancun meeting, WTO members were relatively calm and muted in the aftermath of the failure in Geneva in July 2008. Lamy suspended negotiations saying "no one was throwing in the towel" and "the dust needed to settle a little before further steps were decided". Some informal dialogue has taken place subsequently but there appear to be low expectations of negotiations resuming in 2008 and many expect this will not be possible before 2010 given electoral cycles in both the U.S. and India.

Disappointment over the latest failure to conclude the Doha negotiations has been sharpest among the agricultural exporting countries, both developed and developing, which have been most strongly committed to the process from the outset. Surprisingly strong rebukes were also issued by some smaller developing countries, including some with interests in tropical products and cotton who expected the texts in play to have generated meaningful benefits. More clearly than at any previous point in the WTO negotiating process, the sharpness of differences among developing countries has been evident, in some respects overshadowing traditional north-south cleavages and raising questions about the viability of the G20 as a continuing force in the process.

It remains to be seen whether the work accomplished up to the point of suspension, including the informal Lamy proposal, can be preserved in the event that negotiations resume. And while there is reasonable confidence that the existing WTO rules framework remains solidly intact, questions are being asked about whether the organization in its current form can be expected to make any further progress with comprehensive liberalizing rounds of negotiations.

IFPRI's Outputs—August 2006 to July 2008

IFPRI's active tracking of developments in the negotiations and production of research contributions aimed at influencing their outcome continued in late 2006 and through July 2008. Again, the focus was squarely on the interests of developing countries, and especially those which had not always been at the forefront of analysis or negotiator attention in the past. A number of IFPRI reports were produced in collaboration or were commissioned by development-oriented think tanks or advocacy groups including the Hewlett Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, and Bread for the World. Again, also, work by Bouët and others at IFPRI brought compelling evidence to bear on the realities of the different circumstances of developing countries, and argued, against the background of a realistic appreciation of the state of the Doha round, for adjustments to negotiating proposals which would have positive impacts on both global growth and welfare and as much as possible, on the poorest of the developing countries.

Examples of this work include the chapter on preference erosion by Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean (2006) in the World Bank's book on Agricultural trade Reform and Doha. The preference erosion question had continued as a difficult challenge in the Doha process and for development oriented commentators. This issue had been put squarely on the table in Geneva, especially by the ACP group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries concerned especially about their post-Doha prospects in the EU market. Other developing countries seeking opportunities to compete in Europe took a different view and more generally, some were concerned that high protection industrialized countries were shielding domestic interests through arguments about the development implications of reform. The article by Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean tackled the issue head on, elaborated the likely impacts, and concluded that concerns about preference erosion were real, but that the policy response should not be the status quo. It explored alternatives, including 'aid for trade' initiatives, but also pointed to nonagricultural opportunities in the Doha negotiation such as DFQF access for LDCs and simplified rules of origin in textiles and clothing.

Other useful material directed towards the negotiators appeared in 2007 with two products from Berisha-Krasniqi and Bouët (Berisha-Krasniqi and Bouët 2007a and 2007b) bringing forward the results of updated analysis and underlining the importance of getting the details right in agreement which would be of benefit to all. Again, IFPRI stressed the importance of ambition in agricultural trade reform and liberalization in services as well as trade facilitation to generate sufficient welfare benefits overall. The authors also underlined the importance of complementary aid for trade and other measures to assist the most negatively affected developing countries and those likely to struggle with transition to new trade realities.

IFPRI's attention turned specifically to the issue of agricultural trade reform and Africa's trade performance in work by Bora, Bouët, and Roy (2007) and Bouët, Berisha-Krasniqi, Mevel, and Sade (2005) de-constructing the detailed and varied market access opportunities available to different African countries and using a gravity model to assess the impact of infrastructure. Again, it concludes that generally speaking Africa's market access is good but enhanced preferential opportunities could be important and aid for trade solutions focused on infrastructure could be very important in helping some African countries cope with supply-side constraints.

Other detailed work on the Near East and North Africa was produced in 2007 by IFPRI in collaboration with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (Minot and Daniels 2005). The report compares the effects of multilateral liberalization with the gains from

bilateral trade agreements with the EU and US for 13 countries of this region, most of whom are net importers of agricultural products: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, the Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. It concluded that multilateral liberalization generally resulted in net gains (especially when in combination with macroeconomic reforms) and generally were greater than those from bilateral agreements, including within the region.

A major study by Orden Cheng, Nguyen, Grote, Thomas, Mullen, and Sun, drawing together the results of the PSE estimates for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam was published, reflecting important work over several years and offering important and detailed insights into the agricultural economies and trade prospects of these countries (Orden et al. 2007). Orden's work on U.S. farm policies was also progressed in this period with the publication of a paper elaborating a concept of buyout program for the heavily subsidized U.S. sugar industry. In view of the continuing criticism in Doha over the U.S. offer on domestic support and the lack of ambition evident in Congressional debate about a new farm bill, this work attracted significant attention.

The more activist trade agenda in IFPRI's work program continued into 2008. A contribution of note, which had been some years in development, was a book by Anwarul Hoda, a former WTO Deputy Director General, and Ashok Gulati, IFPRI's Delhi-based Asia Director, which traces Doha's origins and progress and draws out opportunities for developing countries (Hoda and Gulati 2008). It elaborates India's situation in considerable detail but also assesses those of other major participants (US, EU, Cairns Group, and G33 countries), concluding with some suggested negotiating approaches for developing countries. The work took account of Doha developments through to 2006 and provides useful background material and thoughtful analysis and commentary on the circumstances and perspectives of developing countries, especially India.

Papers prepared by IFPRI staff in two significant projects in March 2008 directly targeted Doha negotiators as they are grappling with efforts to settle a final outcome for the Round.

The first was a group of papers co-authored by David Laborde with other leading experts at a Conference in Geneva in March 2008 jointly organized by IFPRI, ICTSD, and IFAP with the papers subsequently published by ICTSD (Blandford, Laborde, and Martin 2008; Gopinath and Laborde 2008; Jean, Josling, and Laborde 2008). These papers assessed the impact of the May 2008 Falconer draft agriculture modalities text on key participants in the negotiations. Laborde's work with others covered the US, the EU, and India while others covered Brazil.

Insights from this work drew on expert knowledge of the progressively more complex provisions appearing in the draft Doha negotiating texts and methodologies which were being refined in collaboration, for example with World Bank staff, for estimating how particular countries would act, for example in relation to special and sensitive product exemptions, to give effect to Doha outcomes. The results for India were of great interest given the pivotal role it was playing in the negotiations. Gopinath and Laborde concluded that with the flexibilities available to India it was unlikely that any reductions would be required from its existing applied tariffs unless it offered duty free quota free access to LDCs. They also concluded that India would have ample flexibility under existing policy settings to continue its domestic support arrangements. Gopinath and Laborde's work on impacts for the US and the EU were also of real value at this stage of the negotiation, putting into clear focus and with a high degree of credibility and objectivity, the

implications of proposals on the table. This timely contribution helped other WTO members, especially from developing countries, make judgments about what might be possible in the end game.

The second key contribution in 2008 was made by Orden and others through a series of papers for a Conference organized by IFPRI in March 2008, in this case dealing only with the WTO's domestic support provisions. Orden presented the case for closer scrutiny of member country notifications as a cross check on whether WTO obligations are being met and given delays in notifications, devised "shadow" data to assess developments. A forward-looking approach was adopted including a discussion of alternative support definitions. Orden (with Blandford) then treated the U.S. in detail and Cororaton covered the Philippines.

A separate publication by Laborde (ICTSD 2008) produced a timely follow on from earlier IFPRI work with Bouët and others on duty free quota free (DFQF) access for LDCs. It demonstrated convincingly that the possible exclusion by developed countries of 3 percent of their tariff lines under this provision in the draft modalities text would severely undermine the benefits for many LDCs given export product concentration and the effects of preference erosion. The paper went on to demonstrate how significantly LDCs would benefit if the major emerging economies offered them DFQF access as they were encouraged to do in the draft texts since the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting. In the case of these emerging economies, unlike the case for developed countries, meaningful benefits for LDCs were assessed to result even from provision of DFQF access for 97 percent of tariff lines.

Laborde also collaborated with World Bank authors, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe, in a very useful assessment of the implications of the May 2008 draft Agriculture and NAMA modalities texts on developing countries (Laborde, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 2008). It was one of the most comprehensive evaluations produced, taking account of the myriad flexibilities being proposed for various groups of WTO members, particularly developing countries. Combining the impacts of both the agriculture and NAMA provisions the authors were able to produce an authoritative assessment of the likely value of the liberalization implied, ultimately concluding the gains would be worthwhile for developing countries despite the fact that flexibilities substantially eroded the outcome.

By July 2008, IFPRI's engagement in debate and analysis relevant to the Doha negotiations had well and truly recovered from the flat period from 2004 to 2005. IFPRI's publications, and work its staff were doing in collaboration with highly regarded researchers and institutions (the World Bank, ICTSD), have had the effect of recovering and building on IFPRI's standing as a valuable source of agricultural trade research, well pitched to the complexity and rhythm of real time Doha negotiations.

IV. VALUING IFPRI'S DOHA RESEARCH: CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES

Assessing the impact of policy-related research and related activity presents significant methodological challenges and has received considerable attention in the CGIAR network and indeed through research efforts of IFPRI itself with contributions like the volume by Pardey and Smith entitled “What’s Economics Worth?” (2004). In that book, Bruce Gardner contributes a chapter (pp. 201–222) which comments directly on efforts to value research contributions to trade liberalization, and notes the plausibility of the view that agricultural economists’ assessments of the welfare benefits of liberalization have had substantial considering the policy changes that have occurred in response to anticipated social benefits. He notes, equally, that the work of economists who have argued against trade liberalization must be included on the cost side.

An unavoidable dilemma in this area, however, is the absence of a settled consensus on the net welfare benefits measured in GDP terms of various trade liberalization scenarios and indeed a substantial part of the contribution of IFPRI’s Doha work has been to refine and disaggregate the estimated net benefits (or costs) of different liberalization scenarios. Even at the low end of the range, the estimated potential benefits are very substantial, with IFPRI’s estimates falling in the range of between \$158 billion for full global liberalization in agriculture to \$41 billion for an unambitious Doha scenario (Berisha-Krasniqi and Bouët 2007a). As elaborated in Bouët’s 2006 comparative analysis published as an IFPRI Research Brief, however, the implied world welfare increase estimates in various studies by a factor of ten from 0.3 percent of Hertel and Keeney (2005) to 3.1 percent of Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi (1999). IFPRI’s own estimates are at the lower end of that range at 0.33 percent. Similarly, Bouët (2006) cites estimates of the number of people lifted out of poverty varying from 72 million to 440 million, or a factor of six. In addition to generating estimates for global welfare increases, IFPRI’s development and poverty reduction mission suggests the attention it has rightly given to disaggregating the impacts from trade liberalization scenarios to illuminate the situations of individual and groups of developing countries. Here again the results vary considerably, and as noted in the previous Section, IFPRI and others acknowledge that some developing countries would be net losers from further agricultural trade reform. A particular contribution IFPRI researchers can be considered to have made is to have narrowed somewhat the range of generally accepted estimates through their contribution to the development of the highly regarded and now widely used MACMaps database.

While estimates from IFPRI and other peer reviewed researchers could be taken as a guide to potential benefits from Doha, less the cost involved in producing the research, it seems counter-intuitive to value IFPRI’s work less to the extent that it produces estimates of benefits that are lower than those of researchers. (The cost of producing IFPRI’s Doha-related outputs is outlined later in this Section of the Report.)

As well as uncertainty about the scale of benefits from trade liberalization, there is a complex and lengthy pathway from producing research outputs, to informing and influencing the political decisionmaking process and finally to making of policy decisions which produce growth and development outcomes. Some studies, including that by Jere Behrman (2007) have tackled this conundrum with an impressive degree of rigor. Using a quantitative benefit cost framework as

well as interviews with key decisionmakers, Behrman attempts to determine the extent of influence of an IFPRI program evaluation of Mexico's PROGRESA program and is able to reach informative conclusions about the value of IFPRI's evaluation in the case of one specific piece of IFPRI's research.

By comparison, the IFPRI contributions under consideration in this report include over one hundred research products and 11 examples of trade-related capacity building or training activity over the relevant period. Moreover, the Doha negotiations involved, by the end of July 2008, some 150 member governments with a vast array of actors in both the public and private sectors participating in production of research materials, commentary and advocacy in support of particular negotiating options. There is a wealth of commentary about the motivations and influences in play before the 2001 launch of the Doha negotiations and in the years during which they have been in train, some of which was reflected in Section III of the Report. Isolating the work of IFPRI from others on the decisions of the vast numbers of relevant actor cannot be done with precision. Despite considerable public commentary on the negotiating process and a relatively transparent negotiating environment which provides for the public release of many relevant documents and position papers, the balance of influences on member governments is not often revealed. And since the Doha negotiations remain to be concluded, the impact of IFPRI (and other) research on actual decisions and their resultant development outcomes will not be fully discernable until a considerable time after the outcome is decided and implemented.

In these circumstances, alternative approaches were adopted to assessing the value of IFPRI's Doha contributions. The "Strategic Framework for Impact" used by IFPRI in its internal planning and evaluation processes provides a useful graphical illustration (see below) of the conceptual approach the organization takes to understanding and targeting the impact of its work (see Figure 1).


This approach pays specific attention to IFPRI's research products, its capacity-building activity and its policy communications as vehicles for impact and identifies contact from partners and stakeholders as important influences on the development of the organization's research and other activities. IFPRI outputs are directed to policymakers both directly and through two-way exchanges with media and opinion leaders with the aim of influencing policies, and through policy influence, to have positive impacts on poor people.

Bearing in mind the constraints to isolating impact in relation to a complex endeavor like the Doha trade round, this Report has relied significantly on efforts to draw out direct and indirect evidence of IFPRI's impact on key parties identified in the organization's strategic framework and where possible to trace pathways to policy influence. IFPRI's own intentions and expectations of its trade-related work program were explored in discussions with 18 relevant current or former staff (see Appendix VI). A major endeavor was then made to extract informed opinion about IFPRI's research and capacity-strengthening work through a survey and interviews directed at key parties involved in or associated with the Doha process (see Section V). Detailed research was also undertaken to gather data on citations and media reporting on IFPRI's research products related to Doha (see Section VI).

The discussion above suggests that a straightforward benefit: cost analysis approach to evaluating impact is fraught in relation to activities related to multilateral trade reform.

There are complications in measuring benefits with precision but difficulties were also encountered in measuring the costs of producing IFPRI's Doha-related research and capacity-building contributions. The research products (over one hundred in number) were produced in different areas of the organization and the key division covering trade research underwent reorganization during the review period. Costing information for these specific subsets of outputs was not easily accessible and it was agreed with IFPRI's management that the effort required to trace these costs outweighed the benefits of their inclusion in this report.

Figure 1. IFPRI's Strategic Priorities



V. VIEWS OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS ON IFPRI'S WORK ON THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS

Interviews and Surveys of Key Stakeholders

An e-based survey was sent to around 114 targeted respondents from five key groups seeking views on the quality, usefulness and impact of IFPRI's Doha research and capacity-strengthening activities. (The survey questions are reproduced at Appendix I and the list of respondents, identified by position and presented according to target group is at Appendix II)

Responses were received electronically or through telephone or personal interview with the author of this report, either in or from Washington DC or during visits made to Geneva and Paris during February 2008. Of those contacted, 81 responses were received and among these, 64 included responses to questions seeking rankings of IFPRI's work. Of the total number of 81 survey responses, 30 were received through direct emailed replies and 51 resulted from telephone or personal interview. This personal contact was undertaken in follow-up efforts to ensure an adequate response rate to the survey questions and to allow for broader questioning of some respondents.

The five key groups of respondents were as follows:

- **academic researchers** with considerable expertise in agricultural trade liberalization and well placed to comment on the quality and influence of IFPRI's work;
- **government officials** from a broad range of WTO member governments, including influential players in each of the most active member government groups in the process (G20, G33, Cairns Group, Africa Group, and others) and some holding significant responsibilities, for example, the Doha negotiations chairs of agriculture, rules and TRIPS, and the General Council of the WTO;
- very high-level and expert staff from the major **international organizations** involved or associated with Doha including the Director General and senior staff of the WTO, key trade and agriculture staff of the World Bank, the Director of Trade and Agriculture and senior agriculture staff at the OECD, and staff of the Economic Commission for Africa;
- senior staff from well-regarded think tanks and **nongovernmental organizations** (NGOs) with an active interest and work program in the Doha negotiations; and
- specialist staff from **business and legal** firms with an interest in the Doha outcome.

Views on IFPRI's Research Products

Results of the survey rankings on IFPRI's research products are presented below and are broken down according to the five categories of respondents. Any respondent who indicated that he or she was not very familiar with IFPRI's research on Doha was filtered out of the survey and not asked to complete these rankings. Even where such an indication was given in telephone or personal interview with the author of this report, illuminating comment was often provided on relevant issues, including the question of how IFPRI's work could be enhanced for greater impact and these have been taken into account as relevant.

Figure 2. Overall ranking of usefulness





Figure 3. Overall ranking of quality



Overall, there was a very positive response from respondents on both the usefulness and quality of IFPRI's work. Some 56 percent ranked it as useful or really useful and 44 percent ranked it as somewhat useful. No respondent described IFPRI's work as not very useful (Figure 2). On quality, 55 percent described IFPRI's work as extremely high, 42 percent as moderately high and 3 percent described it as not very high quality (Figure 3).

There was some variation, however, in rankings according to category of respondent with those from think tanks and NGOs attributing the highest rankings to IFPRI's work with 86 percent declaring it to be useful or really useful and 77 percent declaring it to be of extremely high quality. Academic researchers also ranked IFPRI's work more positively for usefulness and

quality than the average with 64 percent declaring it to be useful or really useful and 60 percent of them regarding it as of extremely high quality. By comparison, respondents from international organizations were more inclined to rank IFPRI's Doha work as somewhat useful (70 percent) than useful or really useful (30 percent) and on quality ranked IFPRI's work at slightly lower than the average response. Business and legal respondents (although small in number) also ranked lower than the average (Figures 4 and 5).

Figure 4. Ranking of usefulness by category of respondents (in percent)





Figure 5. Ranking of quality by category of respondents (in percent)



Rankings from government officials were of particular interest and must be weighted heavily in this exercise since these are the most direct actors in the Doha process and arguably have the greatest opportunity to influence the shape of the outcome and its associated development impact. The results for this group were, however, below the average attributed to IFPRI's work in terms of usefulness and quality (with 36 percent and 42 percent respectively according to IFPRI's work the highest rankings compared with the average scores of 56 percent and 54 percent). Interestingly, also, among the 21 people interviewed or surveyed in the government-officials category, a relatively low percentage (67 percent compared with 80 percent of all respondents) considered themselves sufficiently familiar with IFPRI work to participate in the ranking process. Qualitative comment gleaned at interview reinforced the indication that IFPRI's work is less well known and regarded in government circles than in the research and public policy or advocacy communities. A number of otherwise well-informed senior negotiators stated that they rarely saw IFPRI product in either electronic or hard copy format.

Other relevant information gleaned from survey responses included that research from all sources, as well as specifically from IFPRI, which was judged to be the most useful or influential. By a very significant margin, respondents in all categories described research from the World Bank as having had the greatest impact and/or value in the Doha negotiations. A clear majority of respondents in all categories cited World Bank materials as the most influential research, especially its modeling of estimated benefits from liberalization and later work assessing poverty impacts of trade liberalization. Most indicated a strong positive regard for this work though many respondents noted the progressive refinement of World Bank estimates of benefits from agricultural trade liberalization which had the effect of reducing the expected net welfare benefits. Some respondents noted that optimistic early estimates from the World Bank and others had some negative effects on the negotiating process by engendering cynicism and undermining the impetus for reform.

Many respondents indicated a strong appreciation for IFPRI's work for having been more attentive from the outset of the Doha process about potential negative consequences for some developing countries or some vulnerable groups within developing countries from various trade liberalization scenarios and thus producing results which made intuitive sense. Against the background of more negative sentiment about trade liberalization, especially in developing countries and development advocacy groups (see Section III of the report), a large number of respondents specifically remarked on the high standing and credibility of IFPRI's work. Comments included that IFPRI "presented its work objectively," "doesn't take sides," was "prepared to revisit issues when its research threw up different conclusions from its earlier work," and "didn't shy away from conclusions which might not be popular." On quality, comments included remarks like "IFPRI's research is up there with other influential work on the round" and from one active NGO group "we find IFPRI's work very credible even when we don't agree with its conclusions".

Apart from material from the World Bank, research which attracted frequent comment included contributions from individual academic researchers with the GTAP project at Purdue receiving a number of positive references and the work of Hertel, Sumner, Josling, Winters, and Thompson mentioned by many.

While not matching the World Bank's research for impact, IFPRI's work was generally seen by respondents as falling into the same category of influence as that from other well-known

institutions with global membership or reach including the OECD and, less often, the FAO, UNCTAD. A number of respondents, especially from governments and international organizations cited research from institutions with established impact in particular regions or negotiating groups. These included ICONE in Brazil, ABARE in Australia, CEPII in France, and the USDA's Economic Research Service. The International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and its widely read *Bridges* newsletter, attracted frequent comment for influence and reliability especially from government officials and respondents from think tanks and NGOs. Oxfam and the Carnegie Endowment also attracted considerable comment and to a somewhat lesser extent, materials from the International Food and Trade Policy Research Council (IPC), the Hewlett Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund.

A number of government respondents commented that in-house research materials tailored to their specific national interests in the negotiations but not released publicly had played a very significant part in the evolution of their negotiating positions in the Doha round. Some developing-country representatives who expressed this view said such material had not been available in previous trade negotiations but that new investment in internal research capability had changed the way they operated. Some research materials of this kind had been circulated within Geneva-based negotiating groups such as Cairns and G20 and analysis from Agriculture Canada was mentioned by some as very useful.

Of IFPRI's research materials, there was reasonable consistency among categories of respondents about what had been the most influential or useful. Impact assessments of Doha scenarios were very commonly cited as useful with most respondents referring to work over the last two or three years based on the Mirage model and the MACMaps database. Particular recognition was given to work by Bouët's opening up the "black box" of trade modeling and IFPRI work on trade preferences, preference erosion, and the DFQF access for LDCs issue. Many respondents also referred to IFPRI's earlier work on the "development box" and food-security typology analysis by Diaz-Bonilla and others. Orden's work on U.S. agricultural policies attracted frequent positive comment from all groups. Among academic researchers and government officials, IFPRI's work on PSEs in developing countries was identified as of high value although some respondents took issue with the methodological approach IFPRI had taken on exchange rate misalignment in relation to PSE estimation. Respondents across all groups commented positively about the quality and value of IFPRI's country- and commodity-specific trade impact analysis with the cotton study on Benin and subsequent work on Pakistan mentioned in particular. More generally, a number of respondents identified elements of IFPRI's 2020 Vision work, including market projections, as of high overall value.

Views on IFPRI's Capacity-Strengthening and Training Activities

Limited information was gathered in survey and interview responses about the quality and value of IFPRI's capacity building work (see Appendix VII for the list of those activities). In the relevant period for this report, IFPRI's trade-related training and associated activities were conducted in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Senegal, Peru, Kenya, and Tanzania as well as a session held in Washington DC. A detailed assessment of their individual value and impact is beyond the scope of this report but information made available by IFPRI reveals that a central element in the workshops and training was the development and use of CGE modeling tools. Most of the course elements ran for between two and four weeks and

involved participants from both government ministries and research institutions. Course work commonly involved practical exercises which applied these analytical tools to prominent policy issues in play in those countries. Recent examples have included the preparation during the training course in Peru in 2007 of an assessment of the impact of a free trade agreement between Peru and the U.S. Positive follow-up comment received from Peru's Minister of Foreign Trade indicates that the model has since been adapted to analyze the impact of bilateral trade agreement scenarios with other potential trading partners. Course work from a four-week training course in Senegal on trade modeling in 2007 resulted in the preparation of a report on the impact of Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and ACP countries which received prominent attention in government and public debate with clear indications that the exercise influenced the evolution of Senegal's negotiations with Brussels.

Turning to the survey undertaken specifically for this study, most respondents indicated they did not have sufficient direct exposure to IFPRI's capacity-building work to rank its usefulness. Of the 16 respondents who offered comment in this area, only 10 assessed usefulness, with an equal distribution between the extremely useful and moderately useful rankings. Qualitative comments from participants and observers of these activities suggest considerable value is seen in assisting developing countries which have limited trade analytical capacity to develop skills in this area. Target countries needed to be selected carefully, not least because a number of providers of this sort of assistance are active in the field. Careful selection of participants in capacity-building activities was also stressed, with potential important opportunities for dialogue with policy decisionmakers as a priority. Some combination of capacity training activity and IFPRI-managed research involving direct field work was seen as very helpful in this regard, with IFPRI's work in Pakistan seen as a very good example. Some suggested that training in model building involved such heavy investment to produce worthwhile continuing capability and that it might be more productive to focus instead on training in the interpretation of modeling results. Others, however, stressed the value of policymakers in developing countries being able to see through their own the modeled impacts of alternative policy options.

Views About How IFPRI Might Enhance the Impact of Its Trade-Related Work

Survey and interview responses to questions about IFPRI's influence on the Doha negotiations and ways in which that could be enhanced frequently suggested more attention needed to be paid to dissemination, particularly to participants in the negotiating process.

Large numbers of respondents stressed the importance of IFPRI having a more regular presence in Geneva and key capitals in both developing countries and key donor countries. Some went so far as to suggest the establishment of an IFPRI office in Geneva or shared facilities with a like-minded development-oriented organization. Some expressed the view, consistent with the conclusions of Section III of the Report, that IFPRI had made an important early contribution to the Doha process and in recent years had built its contribution very considerably. In the intervening years, however, it was seen to have "vacated the space" to some extent at a time when positions on key issues in the negotiations had become rather firmly set. It was therefore important, they argued, for IFPRI now to engage more energetically in the process to be heard.

Geneva-based negotiators and WTO Secretariat staff underlined the importance of direct engagement for building understanding and awareness of IFPRI's work. This was seen as necessary to establish rapport of confidence and trust with negotiators but also to attune IFPRI's

researchers to the main issues and concerns affecting the positions adopted in the negotiations. One respondent from an influential research institution said it was important to be willing to take preliminary research results to the negotiators in Geneva and key capitals to “road test” their validity, to answer difficult questions and to build a practical sense of the key issues for a relevant forward research agenda. In addition to open events to publicize important research results, many suggested it was very important to engage also at the level of the member-driven negotiating groups where more frank and targeted exchange could occur. Coordinating Ambassadors from three of the key negotiating groups (G20, Africa, and G33) indicated their willingness to facilitate presentations by IFPRI researchers. Other influential institutions suggested IFPRI consider partnerships for joint activities, along the lines of a workshop organized in March 2008 with ICTSD which explored the implications of the then most recent draft modalities text issued by the chair of the negotiations. Others suggested IFPRI could expand the work it did with think tanks and groups more specialized in publicizing research findings and advocating policy responses to governments and others.

In responding to questions about enhancing impact many respondents stressed the importance of IFPRI retaining its reputation for research quality, objectivity, and credibility. A number of interviewees suggested that a large volume of less reliable material on Doha was being circulated to negotiators and it was important for rigorous and objective material to be aired. Much material was seen as being “made to measure” research and some government respondents indicated frankly that they sought out and made use of material which supported their negotiating positions while deflecting or ignoring that which was at odds with them.

To be of real value to negotiators, many indicated research should be presented in short, clear format and those who were familiar with IFPRI’s Research Briefings commented positively on them in these respects. They also stressed it was important for research to be focused on critical issues actually in play or looming in the negotiations. Research, however compelling, which deals with issues that have already been resolved is of limited value to negotiators.

Some felt IFPRI might have “paid a price” for being too serious and not chasing punchy headlines. They argued that IFPRI should be more assertive in commenting on poor quality research and arguing more firmly for positions which would be growth and development friendly. Others saw a delicate balancing act between quality and advocacy and expressed some anxiety about IFPRI moving too far in the direction of advocacy. Most felt the balance was reasonably good with IFPRI neither shying away from controversy (for example, in its work on ambition and special products) nor reducing complexity and quality to achieve headlines. Almost all, however, said that more effort was needed to attract the attention of negotiators and other influential commentators.

Targeted emailing of IFPRI’s research reports and briefings to key players in Geneva, trade advisors in capitals, and other influential groups was seen as very important to make sure its exposure was increased. Several respondents suggested that attention to the quality and navigability of IFPRI’s website would help it to enhance exposure of its trade work. Establishing links on websites of other organizations, including the WTO, was also suggested as a good way to build focus around new work.

Outside the immediate negotiating environment, some suggested IFPRI might be able to enhance the prominence given to its trade work if it published more substantial research volumes from

time to time, along the lines of the landmark World Bank products such as the Hertel and Winters volume on Poverty and the WTO (2006). Another suggestion was for the publication of a compendium which would update and draw together the most important pieces of IFPRI's research on Doha. Yet another idea was for flagship agricultural trade report to be produced on an annual basis, to mark IFPRI's place in this field and attract a regular following of the kind that accompanies the World Bank's World Development Report or the OECD's Monitoring and Evaluation Reports.

The importance of a continuing focus on the negotiations was argued by one government official actively involved in the process who indicated that in the early Doha period IFPRI's work had been a key resource but that after the drop away in research outputs in the 2003–2004 period they had “simply stopped checking IFPRI's website”.

These comments and other ideas are developed further as recommendations in the final Section of the Report.

VI. IFPRI'S DOHA RESEARCH IN CITATIONS AND MEDIA REPORTING

To supplement the views about IFPRI's work from expert observers and participants in the Doha negotiations presented in the last Section of the report, this Section considers information available from a major citation database and an online bibliographic information service for the full years in which data are available between 1999 and 2007. An analysis has also been made of references to IFPRI's Doha related research in media reporting.


The material presented in this Section has the advantage of offering objective data on the impact of IFPRI's Doha research. That said, these sources can only be considered a partial measure of impact. The citation and bibliographic databases provide useful insights into the absolute and relative frequency with which each of the IFPRI Doha-related research products have been cited or downloaded but there is a natural skewing in the usage of these sources of information to the academic and research communities. As noted in the previous Section and in the Statement of Work associated with this evaluation project, the views of policymakers involved in the Doha negotiations is considered to be particularly relevant and they are unlikely to be reflected in this data. A review of media references to IFPRI's Doha work provides a different and important insight into the extent to which IFPRI materials have been entered into broader public debate about the negotiations and an attempt is made in this Section to evaluate IFPRI's media 'reach'.

Google Scholar Citations

Google scholar was chosen as the most broadly representative database of citations appropriate to this subject matter. It includes citation information from peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed papers, theses, books, abstracts, and articles, from academic publishers, professional societies, pre-print repositories, universities, and other scholarly organizations. To a greater extent than some other citations databases, it includes less formal research materials such as policy briefs, discussion papers, working papers conference papers, and dissertations. Further information about Google Scholar is available at <http://scholar.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html>.


A search of Google Scholar revealed that of the 90 IFPRI research outputs related to Doha from 1999 to 2007 reviewed for this Report (listed in Appendix V), 61 were captured and of those, 55 outputs were cited at least once and six were captured but not cited. As shown in Figure 6 over half of the 496 citations referred to 11 IFPRI authored journal articles and 14 discussion papers. Another 31 percent of citations referred to two books and seven book chapters by IFPRI authors. The rest referred to other forms of IFPRI publications such as five research briefs, 10 conference papers, one research report, and five other publications (essays, press briefings, etc.). Figure 7 shows the number of IFPRI publications per year and how many times those publications were cited between 2000–2007. For example, in 1999 there were three IFPRI publications accounting for 65 citations in various sources. Table 1 shows the types of publications which cited IFPRI's work, with the most common forms of citations being reports and journal articles.

Figure 6. Share of citations by type of IFPRI-authored publication (2000–2007)



Note: “Other” denotes IFPRI authored publications including essays, press briefings, and commentaries.

Figure 7. Number of citations of IFPRI-authored publication (2000–2007)



**Table 1. Types of publications citing IFPRI's work on Doha by year
(Covers IFPRI's research from 1999–2007)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Books	2	2	0	9	10	15	19	14	71
Briefs	0	2	1	3	0	0	2	3	11
JA	2	6	4	8	10	24	26	29	109
Reports	1	3	4	19	34	35	24	18	138
Other	1	3	16	20	27	31	32	37	167
Total cit. per year	6	16	25	59	81	105	103	101	496

Notes:

- a) "JA" denotes journal articles, including both peer-reviewed and non-peer reviewed.
- b) "Reports" include citations of IFPRI's work in discussion papers, working papers, and research reports.
- c) "Other" includes conference papers, keynote addresses, dissertations, essays, and other short, non-peer reviewed publications.

The following three figures reflect the number of citations of IFPRI's Doha research between 2000 and 2007. In Figure 8, this information is broken down by the type of publication in which the citation appeared. Figure 9 shows the total number of citations collectively in each year of this period. Figure 10 shows in a pie chart which types of publications cited IFPRI's Doha work.

**Figure 8. Types of publications citing IFPRI's work on Doha
(Covers IFPRI's research from 1999–2007)**




Figure 9. Total number of citations per year (2000–2007)




Figure 10. Share of various publications citing IFPRI (2000–2007)





Figure 11 shows the top 20 IFPRI's Doha-related publications cited in Google Scholar. Interestingly, the top two entries in this list are not materials directly related to the Doha negotiations. Rather, they are the short book by Josling, Roberts, and Orden (2004) on food regulation and trade and the work by Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe (1999) on policy reform in American agriculture. The next two most commonly cited outputs reflect more closely the views of survey respondents about the most useful IFPRI work on Doha, with the Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, Robinson, and Cattaneo (2000) discussion paper on food security and the WTO in third position and the Bouët, Bureau, Decreux, and Jean (2005) article on the contrasting fortunes of developing countries in trade liberalization in fourth place. Minot and Daniels' work on cotton

and rural poverty in Benin (2005) was in fifth place, followed by the Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2004) discussion paper on regionalism and then the Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean (2006) chapter on preference erosion which appeared in a World Bank volume.

There are few other surprises in the rankings by citation of the research materials with those highlighted in Section V of this Report reflecting the views of participants and commentators on the Doha negotiations generally also attracting attention. There is unavoidably some distortion in the Google Scholar count since those materials produced earlier in the period can be captured over a larger number of years than more recent research. Nevertheless, this data provide some collateral information about the relative interest, at least as reflected in the research-oriented community, in IFPRI's Doha work.

**Figure 11. Top 20 most cited IFPRI's publications from Google Scholar
(Cumulative citations 2000–2007)**



RePEc Download Information

An alternative set of information on accessing of IFPRI's Doha materials was extracted from the RePEc (Research Papers in Economics), a volunteer-driven initiative of the University of Wisconsin providing bibliographic information on working papers, journal articles, books, chapters in books, and software components. Further information about RePEc is available at <http://repec.org/>.

Of the 90 IFPRI research outputs from 1999 to 2007 under consideration for this Report, only 36 were uploaded in the RePEc database of which 5 were not downloaded and 31 were downloaded at least once. They are mainly discussion papers and journal articles, in effect because these forms of research were most commonly available in the RePEc database (see figure 12). Unfortunately, most of the information sought from RePEc was generally only available from 2003.

Figure 13 displays information on RePEc downloads and abstract views of IFPRI publications by year for the period 2003 to 2007.

Figure 12. Share of downloads by type of IFPRI-authored publication





Figure 13. Downloads and abstract views of IFPRI publications (2003–2007)



An analysis of the particular IFPRI research outputs most commonly downloaded tells a somewhat different story from the Google Scholar citations and the survey respondent information.

The most commonly downloaded item was the Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005) discussion paper on PSE estimates for India followed by the discussion paper version of the Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2000) work on small countries and regionalism vs. multilateralism, a further elaboration of which from 2004 was the fourth most commonly downloaded work (see Figure 14). Thomas and Orden's discussion paper on agricultural policies and PSEs in Indonesia (2004) came in at third ranking and at fifth ranking was another of the PSE-related studies in the form of a discussion paper which drew on PSE work on India and China to explore measurement issues and in particular the treatment of exchange rate misalignment. Work by Diaz-Bonilla and others on food security and trade liberalization is represented in various formats in relatively high rankings (sixth, eighth, eleventh, and twelfth), a discussion paper by Morley and Pineiro (2004) on the WTO, the FTAA and poverty in Mexico appears at seventh and Orden's 2002 discussion paper on the Farm Bill, and the U.S. WTO proposal is at 10th ranking. Diao et al. (2003) on China's WTO accession ranks 12th and Minot and Daniels' cotton study on Benin is in 13th place. Bouët et al. (2006) on preference erosion is at 14th place.

Figure 14. Top 20 downloads of IFPRI's publications from RePEc (Cumulative downloads 2003–2007)





Figure 15 provides download statistics for 26 IFPRI publications from IFPRI's website. These statistics are available only for 2006–2007 and there is an unavoidable distortion in the data since the most recent publications have been available for download for a briefer period. The picture which emerges, nevertheless, is of substantial interest across the full spectrum of IFPRI's Doha-related research. High interest for particular outputs that was reflected in our survey and

interviews as well as in the Google and RePEc databases is captured well by the download information from IFPRI's own website.

Figure 15. Downloads from IFPRI's website (2006–2007)



It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the use to which downloaded material has been put since the context in which they are used is not recorded as is the case with citations. What seems clear, however, is that there is a serious market for the detailed and scholarly work on trade liberalization and the agricultural sectors of developing countries. The high interest in both RePEc and IFPRI downloads in IFPRI's PSE-related outputs provides support for the value of this intensely detailed and resource intensive work as an input to further work in this field. The more negotiations-oriented work, particularly that of Bouët and others in more recent years, has not captured the same level of interest in RePEc downloads as it did in the survey and interview respondent group more closely connected with the Doha negotiations. For illustration, the 2006 discussion paper on what the poor could expect from trade liberalization received 37 downloads compared with 392 for the Mullen, Orden, and Gulati discussion paper on PSEs and Indian agriculture (see Figure 14). By comparison, however, the more negotiations-focused work of Bouët and others from 2005–2006 received high download counts from IFPRI's website and further downloads for the more recent outputs could be expected (Figure 15).

Comparing IFPRI's Citation and Download Counts with Research from Other Providers

To provide a comparison with citations of IFPRI's work, Google Scholar citations and RePEc download information were extracted for three significant World Bank research products and the 2006 Carnegie study on Doha authored by Sandra Polaski. These particular research products

have been chosen because they were all produced at around the same time (late 2005 and 2006) and because each attracted considerable attention in the negotiations and associated media debate in the lead-up to and aftermath of the WTO's Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. The World Bank outputs chosen for comparison were the paper by Anderson and Martin released in November 2005 on agricultural trade reform and Doha, the larger volume of papers edited by Anderson and Martin in which the paper was reproduced as the first chapter, published in 2006, and a chapter by Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe in another 2006 World Bank volume on Doha edited by Richard Newfarmer. The IFPRI outputs chosen as relevant comparators are the Bouët, Bureau, and Decreux article which also attracted attention with its argument that previous estimates of benefits from Doha had been too high and the Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean work on preference erosion which actually appeared in the 2006 World Bank volume edited by Anderson and Martin. The 2006 Carnegie study by Polaski also had high profile in the negotiating environment as attested by interview and survey respondents.

The results are set out below and overall show that leading IFPRI research compares rather favorably with high impact research from other sources. The Google Scholar citations for the two pieces of work by Bouët and others scored between the numbers of citations for the individual pieces of World Bank authored research. And since the Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean research was included in the 2006 World Bank publication edited by Anderson and Martin, it can be seen in a sense as sharing the highest citation count (144) of this exercise.

Table 2. Comparison of citation and download statistics for similar work published by IFPRI and the World Bank

Publication	Google Citations	RePEc downloads
Anderson, Kym, and Will Martin. 2005. "Agricultural trade reform and the Doha development agenda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3607, The World Bank.	18	261
Anderson, Kym, and Will Martin. 2005. <i>Agricultural trade reform and the Doha development agenda</i> . Cambridge.	144	no downloads recorded
Anderson, K., W. Martin, and D. van der Mensbrugghe. 2006. "Doha policies: Where are the payoffs?," in <i>Trade, Doha, and development: A window into the issues</i> , ed. R. Newfarmer, ch. 3. Washington DC: World Bank.	6	no downloads recorded
Polaski, S. 2006. <i>Winners and losers: Impact of the Doha round on developing countries</i> . Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.	68	no downloads recorded
Bouët, A., J. C. Bureau, Y. Decreux, and S. Jean. 2005. "Multilateral agricultural trade liberalization: The contrasting fortunes of developing countries." <i>The World Economy</i> 28(9): 1329–1354.	34	no downloads recorded
Bouët, A., L. Fontagné, and J. Sebastien. 2006. "Is erosion of tariff preferences a serious concern?," in <i>Agricultural trade reform and the Doha development agenda</i> , eds. K. Anderson and W. Martin, pp. 161–192. Washington, DC: Oxford University Press and the World Bank.	27	44

Media Coverage of IFPRI's Doha Research


A search of the information held by IFPRI's Communications Division about media references to Doha-related work has been reported below by numbers of news articles or electronic media shows in the period from 2001 to 2007. Table 3 displays the raw data which cumulatively comes to 230 references over the eight years.

**Table 3. Summary of Media Coverage of IFPRI's work on Doha
(Number of news articles or news shows referring to IFPRI from 2001–2008)**

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec.	Total /Year
2001	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	8
2002	4	0	0	6	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	14
2003	3	0	5	4	3	5	0	28	40	4	1	3	96
2004	1	1	4	0	5	2	1	3	2	3	0	0	22
2005	2	6	11	0	5	1	1	3	2	1	6	3	41
2006	1	1	1	1	1	5	18	1	2	1	0	0	32
2007	0	1	0	0	1	7	1	0	1	0	3	3	17
Total/Month	11	10	22	13	16	20	21	37	48	11	12	9	230


Figure 16 shows a breakdown of these references according to whether the media outlet was part of the internationally-represented media outlets such as the wire services (14 percent), those operating in developing countries (49 percent) and those in developed countries (37 percent).

Figure 16. The share of media coverage by region (2001–2008)



The information is also captured in bar chart form in Figure 17 which shows more clearly the bunching of media attention around research relevant to particular events in the Doha process. Very clear peaks occur around the time of the WTO's failed Cancun Conference in August and September of 2003. Another peak of interest is shown in June and July of 2006 around the time that Director General Lamy suspended the Doha negotiations. The third evident lift in interest in IFPRI's Doha commentary from media outlets is in the first half of 2005 when contentious debate was in play about how to translate the 2004 Framework Agreement into full modalities, which was intended to be completed at the Hong Kong Conference in December of that year.

**Figure 17. Media Coverage of IFPRI's work on Doha
(Number of news articles or news shows referring to IFPRI from 2003–2006)**



The detailed information supporting this graph is in a form that does not lend itself easily to representation in a summary form for this Report but has been made available to IFPRI's Communications Division and could be accessed on request. It covers mainstream print media reporting and Op Ed or editorial material as well as radio and television programs mentioning IFPRI's work or interviewing IFPRI researchers. Major international, national and regional outlets figure in the entries. Perhaps reflecting IFPRI's head office location, there is a strong representation of American media outlets. Again, perhaps reflecting IFPRI's field locations, the Indian media also appear with considerable frequency. That said, there is a wide capturing by media outlets across the globe so in the developing countries in addition to India, there are references from Bangladesh, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe. From developed countries, in addition to the preponderance of American national and regional media outlets, references are recorded from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the UK.

The geographic dispersion of IFPRI media references and the strong interest evident from media in the developing world is encouraging and in line with IFPRI's mission. Also encouraging is the

variety of media outlets showing interest in IFPRI's work and the evident effort made by IFPRI researchers to reach broad audiences through their appearances on radio and television programs as well as through background press briefings.

A short comment on the intensity of effort required to compile the necessary information to explore citations and media references to IFPRI's Doha work is hard to avoid. While the material is collected and broadly categorized by subject by IFPRI's routine processes, a very considerable effort was required with research assistance from IFPRI, to put this material into accessible form that could be analyzed in a meaningful way. Information of this kind is more readily accessible in some comparable institutions (including the World Bank and the WTO) and its easy availability is essential for an organization well focused on impact in developing and prioritizing its work program. An investment in more systematic entry and logging of impact through citations from the point of publication of individual research outputs would be of considerable value.

VII. ILLUSTRATING PATHWAYS TO IMPACT FROM IFPRI'S DOHA WORK

Section IV of the Report commented on the difficulties involved in evaluating the impact of IFPRI's trade research through the complex and multi-actor business of multilateral trade negotiations. As a supplement to the survey information presented above, this Section draws on narratives extracted from the interview process to illustrate in a tangible way the influence of some specific IFPRI research materials and capacity-building activity on government policies. The further step in IFPRI's strategic framework for impact, from policy change through to impacts on poor people is even more difficult to broach, and as noted above, the time span between decisions on national negotiating positions, through to multilateral trade outcomes and their staged implementation is very long. Some attempt will be made, however, to comment in this area.

Reform in Global Cotton markets and Rural Poverty in Benin

Concern about a dramatic 40 percent decline in world cotton prices in 2001–2002 stimulated an IFPRI project, funded by the World Bank, to examine the impact of these price changes on poverty in Benin. IFPRI, in conjunction with a local research firm in Benin, had collected data during 1998 from 899 households for a BMZ-funded study on the impact of agricultural reform on smallholder farmers in Benin. This data formed a major input to IFPRI's 2002 cotton study conducted by Nicholas Minot and Lisa Daniels.

Benin has a population of about six million with a per capita GDP of \$380, placing Benin in the poorest 20 percent of countries. IFPRI's study adopted a poverty line of \$123 per person per year, at which 40 percent of the rural households are poor. Cotton is grown by about one-third of rural households who are among the poorest of Benin's farmers.

Using the household survey information, Minot and Daniels simulated the effects of cotton price changes on household income and therefore on the proportion of rural households living below the poverty line. The study concluded that a 40 percent reduction in the farm-level price of cotton (as witnessed in 2001–2002) reduced the income of cotton growers by 21 percent and reduced the average income of rural households by 7 percent. This would cause the poverty rate to rise from 40 percent to 48 percent in the short run. In absolute terms, a further 334,000 people would fall below the poverty line. In the long run, farmers would respond by switching to other crops but even in the long run, Minot and Daniels estimated a 46 percent to 47 percent increase in the poverty rate, with a down side risk from multiplier effects on non-cotton growers.

The study drew a clear link between policies which subsidize cotton production in the U.S. and elsewhere which dampen world cotton prices and rural poverty in Benin and other poor cotton-exporting countries.

Minot and Daniels' work was published by IFPRI as a discussion paper in November 2002. (A version of the study was subsequently published in the *Journal of Agricultural Economics*, submitted in 2003 and published in 2005.) The findings were also presented at the Northeast Universities Development Consortium annual meetings in October 2002, at a workshop at the

World Bank in January 2003, and at a seminar at IFPRI in May 2003 for a group of African women working in rural development.

This timing coincided with a growing focus in the WTO on distortions in the world cotton market which were highlighted in a dispute panel (WTO DS 267) established to consider the case brought against U.S. cotton subsidies by Brazil with 15 other countries as third parties to the dispute, including Benin and Chad. Nicholas Minot, the lead researcher in IFPRI's study, was contacted by legal advisors in the case and invited to present his findings to the dispute panel on behalf of Benin as a third party to the dispute. He submitted a short paper outlining the IFPRI conclusions and appeared in person on 6 October 2003. According to a member of the legal team in this case, he was a "very credible expert witness" whose "focus on the poverty implications of developed-country cotton subsidies was critically important". As noted in the time line of key Doha events, the panel reported in September 2004 and the Appellate Body in March 2005, essentially supporting Brazil's claims that the U.S. subsidies were prohibited export subsidies.

In parallel with the WTO dispute, attention of development advocacy groups, and particularly Oxfam, as well as developing-country participants in the Doha process, had turned to the cotton story and in the lead up to the WTO's Cancun Ministerial Conference the issue became something of a lightning rod for arguments that developed countries were offering too little, especially on the domestic support pillar. As outlined in Section III of the Report, pressure for deeper and faster reductions of distortions in developed-country cotton subsidies and market access barriers became something of a cause célèbre in the negotiations. Both at Cancun and at the subsequent WTO Conference in Hong Kong, cotton was given specific attention and treated by some advocates as a litmus test of the development impact of Doha proposals. As noted also in Section III, a cotton-specific negotiating group has established itself as an active part of the negotiations and a special sub-Committee of the agricultural negotiations, also chaired by Crawford Falconer, has been established to follow through on the Hong Kong Conference commitments related to cotton. Subsequent draft modalities texts have included possible cotton-specific commitments contrary to the practice in past rounds and any final agreement will almost certainly include accelerated and deeper cuts in tariffs and domestic support for this product. Some have argued that the focus on cotton has had a distorting effect on the real development issues at stake in Doha. The poverty impacts of distorting developed-country subsidies could be demonstrated starkly in the case of a fiber product. By comparison, when considering the poverty impacts associated with removing distortion in world trade for food products, benefits for developing-country producers have to be considered in the context of offsetting costs for the poorest consumers. Moreover, some argue that the focus on developed-country subsidies through the case of cotton has encouraged developing countries and development NGOs to be inappropriately focused on reforms to domestic support disciplines rather than on market access where most mainstream studies indicate the overwhelmingly largest gains can be made.

There is something to those arguments, but the case made in IFPRI's research was also correct. Some work on West African cotton markets was done around the same time by the World Bank itself (Badiane, Ghura, Goreux, and Masson 2002). Dan Sumner (2006) produced important work on the subject and also appeared as an expert witness for Brazil in the WTO dispute panel hearings. IFPRI's work, however, had particular credibility, not least because of the way it had soundly integrated the detailed household survey information from Benin with simulations of changes in world cotton prices.

It is difficult to imagine a more powerful way for high quality research making the case for the poor to be taken through a pathway of policy influence than through a legally binding dispute resolution process. Tangible action has been taken already to adjust U.S. support policies and while this remains the subject of further WTO dispute action, more changes are anticipated. As noted above, a Doha agreement, when concluded, is also likely to commit faster and deeper action to remove distortions in cotton trade than in the sector generally. It is clear from IFPRI's research and that of others that this will have very significant positive benefits for some of the world's poorest farmers and rural communities. IFPRI's contribution in this area stands as a very impressive example of impact.

Duty Free and Quota Free (DFQF) Market Access for LDCs

Another tangible illustration of influence in IFPRI's Doha work has emerged from the two propositions made by Bouët, Mevel, and Orden (2006b) for making a Doha outcome more development-friendly. Consistent with the arguments from the World Bank and others at the time, IFPRI's authors argued that the relatively unambitious proposals under discussion would have limited development impact. They used the results of their impact modeling to suggest the development impact of an agreement could be significantly enhanced if the EU proposal for 100 percent of all goods from LDCs were given free access to markets rather than allowing for carve outs in line with the positions of some major economies (including the U.S. and Japan). They also called for much more limited sensitive and special product exclusions from general tariff cuts than proposed by the major developed and developing countries in the negotiations.

The numbers on the DFQF scenario were compelling with IFPRI estimating LDCs could lift their real income gain from Doha from around \$1.03 billion without 100 percent DFQF access to \$7 billion if it were included on the Doha outcome. In addition, with the 100 percent DFQF access element, all low-income regions and groups would benefit rather than only five in the basic scenario. These proposals from IFPRI came at a time when, as outlined in section III of the Report, the Doha process was on life support and it was clear that further concessions from most parties would be needed to avoid a complete breakdown. IFPRI had been in active dialogue in Washington with some of the think tanks and development groups (Hewlett Foundation, German Marshall Fund, Bread for the World, and others) who were concerned about the risk of failure for Doha and the Research Brief in part responded to questions from these groups about what could be done.

The Research Brief itself was in the best tradition of policy focused research which incorporated complex material into a short 5-page format without concessions to quality and nuance but written in clear and persuasive language. The material attracted significant media attention, as reflected in Section VI of this Report, including being the central focus of a *New York Times* column by Robert Samuelson and an associated contribution also citing the IFPRI work on 14 August 2006 by Susan Sechler (German Marshall Fund) and Ann Tutwiler (Hewlett Foundation). Moreover, interest in the Duty Free and Quota Free LDC initiative grew as the issue was debated in policy circles in Washington since it was clear that U.S. policy sensitivity to domestic sugar and textile interests was a key obstacle to the proposal being adopted in the WTO. Interest was shown by trade-oriented groups in the U.S. Congress and following briefings and further debate, the idea found some expression in legislation drafted for Congressional consideration.

Within the Congressional environment, the work also stimulated interest in further improvements of the American preferences program more generally. Debate arose around the question of whether moving to 100 percent free access for LDCs would have some damaging impacts on poor African preference recipient countries by allowing tough competition from more competitive countries like Bangladesh. These questions in turn became the subject of further IFPRI research, leading to the Bora, Bouët, and Roy (2007) work which, as described in Section III of this Report, concluded that while preferences were important for a number of African countries, interventions to improve trade-related infrastructure could yield high returns. Put bluntly, it could be more productive to assist poor African countries through targeted Aid for Trade support than through denying other LDCs the opportunity to compete in developed country markets.

The work by Bouët, Mevel, and Orden was followed by an elaboration by Laborde of the DFQF issue using the May 2008 draft modalities text. It presented conclusions and recommendations to negotiators to negotiators which would maximize benefits for LDCs. This work confirmed the conclusion that the exclusion of up to 3 percent of tariff lines by developed countries would largely erode the benefits. It also made a strong case for emerging economies agreeing to extend DFQF treatment to LDCs, even for 97 percent of their tariff lines.

The DFQF proposal from IFPRI's work does not have the same satisfying conclusion as the Benin cotton story. Nevertheless, it is another excellent example of high quality research being presented at the right time and disseminated with skill and vigor to key points of influence in think tanks, NGOs, the media, and the Congress. The issue remains on the table and may yet bear fruit in the eventual Doha outcome.

Re-thinking of Trade Policy Positioning by Pakistan

In the course of the survey and interview work conducted for this Report numerous respondents indicated that IFPRI research products and capacity-building exercises had influenced the attitudes and negotiating positions of participants in Doha.

One such example emerged in discussions with officials and researchers from **Pakistan**, who placed particular importance on the impact in Islamabad of research by Orden, Salam, Dewina, Nazli, and Minot (2006) as part of an Asian Development Bank-funded poverty assessment update. Subsequent work was also done on wheat market impacts in Pakistan. The study used a similar methodology to that used by Minot and Daniels for Benin and generated reductions in poverty in Pakistan of 1.939 million people from a 20 percent increase in cotton prices. In addition, IFPRI had conducted two training sessions in trade analysis focused on CGE modeling for researchers in Pakistan during May and July of 2006.

At the outset of the Doha negotiations, Pakistan had aligned itself with the net food importing group of countries and played an essential defensive role, seeking to limit reduction commitments and calling for special treatment of various kinds. As the negotiations continued, a combination of influences at home and internationally, through debate in Geneva and elsewhere, led to a dramatic shift in Pakistan's position on international trade reform. From its defensive position at the outset of Doha, Pakistan joined the advocates of ambition in the negotiations and became a member of the Cairns Group in December 2005. This change in approach has been attributed to Pakistani policymakers seeing important new opportunities for development and

poverty reduction through export-oriented agriculture not only in cotton and grains but also dairy production. An ambitious liberalizing Doha outcome was therefore deemed to be the most development-friendly way forward and Pakistan's position in the negotiations was adapted accordingly.

Clearly, the change in thinking in Pakistan was already in train by the time IFPRI delivered its training sessions and undertook its work on cotton and wheat. Survey respondents nevertheless indicated that IFPRI's work confirmed and consolidated this change in approach. They indicate that IFPRI's work had an important influence on Pakistan's thinking about the Doha negotiations.

Modeling Trade Scenarios in Peru

A final example of high impact is drawn from IFPRI's capacity-building activity. As listed in Appendix VII, a four-week training exercise on the use of the Mirage model and the MAcMap database was conducted by IFPRI staff, Antoine Bouët and Simon Mevel, in October and November 2006 and February 2007. As part of the training session activity, participants from the Government of Peru and research institutions prepared a report for the Peruvian Government on the impact of a Peru/US FTA. The same modeling format has since been used by Peruvian officials to assess the impacts of FTAs with China and the EU. The value of this modeling capability seen in Peru is reflected in a letter of 20 March, 2007 from the Minister of Finance, Madame Mercedes Araoz Fernandez, to IFPRI's Director General which expressed appreciation for the sessions which had enhanced Peru's capacity to "rigorously identify costs and benefits emerging from a set of trade agreements, useful information to the design of trade policy and an optimum negotiating path...." (informal translation by IFPRI staff).

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Overall Value of IFPRI's Doha Work

An impressive body of research and training outputs

In the period from 1999 to July 2008 during which the Doha negotiations were shaped, launched and have been in progress, IFPRI has produced an impressive body of high quality research relevant to the negotiating process. Its focus, consistent with IFPRI's Vision and Mission, has been squarely on the interests of developing countries and their food security and poverty alleviation objectives.

A modest but useful program of trade-related capacity strengthening activities has also been conducted in carefully chosen developing countries. The need and demand for this sort of assistance is unquestioned. The challenge for IFPRI and other providers is to target its contributions carefully for maximum impact, avoiding duplication with other providers and focusing on building capability that can be adopted in continuing national policy development.

A review of IFPRI's Doha-related research outputs and survey and interview responses confirm the broadly positive appreciation for IFPRI's work. Its emphasis on the differentiated impacts of trade liberalization on developing countries with different circumstances has been consistent and impressive. Good use has been made of the organization's networks and experience in the agricultural sectors of key developing countries to inform the focus of and enrich the quality of IFPRI's work. The quality of IFPRI's analyses is confirmed by the positive reception it receives from expert academic researchers and other commentators and the frequency of publication of IFPRI research in highly regarded peer-reviewed publications and volumes of work edited by leading institutions and professionals.

Value for Money?

IFPRI's trade-related research and capacity-strengthening activities constitute an important but minor part of the organization's overall budget and effort. The precise costs of the 100 or so outputs and training activities from 1999–2008 could not be ascertained for this report. It is relevant to note, however that about **75 percent** of the resources of the global trade program (GRP 2) at IFPRI is derived from external funding sources, compared with **65 percent** for the organization as a whole. This suggests reasonably strong stakeholder support for the program, consistent with the general findings in this Report about the quality and usefulness of the work. The Report does not attempt to present a classical benefits/costs assessment of the Doha-related activity for the reasons set out in Section IV but some suggestions follow for ways in which greater impact could be achieved for a steady or marginally increased investment in IFPRI's trade work.

Attention to targets of influence and continuity of effort

The review of materials and opinions for this project revealed some unevenness in attention to the Doha negotiations, with some falling away of effort during a critical period in the process after the unsuccessful WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancun. At a time when discordant debate about trade and development linkages and their significance for the balance of a Doha outcome

was raging in Geneva, key capitals and development advocacy groups, the priority given by IFPRI to work on global agricultural trade reform reduced in volume. Relevant work was undertaken in this period but it was less well focused on the issues being debated in the Doha round and those most directly involved in its negotiation looked less to IFPRI for input.

IFPRI's research attention to Doha and global trade reform was re-engaged with vigor from late 2005 and in the period since then has been of high quality, consistent, and well-judged. Many close observers of work in this field have appreciated IFPRI's input. Unfortunately, extensive survey and interview contacts suggest there have been more limited appreciation of this work among negotiators in Geneva and many key capitals.

This is not a problem that cannot be addressed. Indeed efforts are already under way by IFPRI staff to increase their contacts with negotiators and excellent recent examples include the participation of IFPRI researchers in expert workshop presentations in Geneva and Washington providing high quality analysis of recent draft Doha texts and WTO working documents. Some of this work has been done in collaboration with the Geneva-based ICTSD, and some with staff of CEPII and the World Bank. This has added strong complimentary expertise to IFPRI's work along with a shared focus on development concerns. A number of papers and interviews also been published in the French language, helping with outreach to a broader audience for IFPRI's work.

Sustained continuing efforts of this kind are needed to re-establish IFPRI as an acknowledged centre of high quality and relevant research in this field and to ensure that IFPRI's future trade-related research remains well targeted on key negotiating issues. More regular visits to Geneva should be maintained and contact with key negotiating groups, especially those focused on developing-country concerns such as the G20, G33, LDC, ACP, and Tropical Products, Cotton and Africa Groups is important. I did not find arguments for a permanent Geneva presence particularly compelling. Apart from the high cost involved, the Doha Round could well be stalled for some time. Other influential targets for presentations of IFPRI work include key WTO Secretariat staff, development groups with local offices and representatives of other parties, including developed countries, to the negotiation.

Much can be done between to supplement contacts in Geneva through targeted dissemination of reports especially electronically. A number of well placed observers suggest that too little high quality research material finds its way into the Geneva process. IFPRI has already grasped the essentials of presentation of its work in formats well pitched to a policy audience, that is, in clear, short briefing documents which convey complex information in readable style. The challenge for IFPRI now is to disseminate this material more intensively to target recipients.

Balance between research and policy targets

IFPRI, like other research institutions, has to strike a proper balance between efforts to foster and affirm the analytical quality of its research and efforts to engage with parties closer to the outcomes and implementation end of the organization's strategic framework for influence. The former involves resources-intensive investments in activities such as submissions to peer-reviewed publications, participation in academic conferences and long-term investments in building databases and detailed field-tested knowledge of conditions in the agricultural and rural

sectors of developing countries. At the other end of the spectrum, resources are required for engagement with negotiators and other policymakers, policy advocates, and the media.

IFPRI cannot be successful without careful attention to both targets. Attention to analytical rigor is the essential underpinning of its credibility in policy research and the research is unlikely to have high impact without vigorous attention to the issues under debate in the applied policy world and targeted dissemination of timely contributions to those debates.

Based on the findings of this Report, there is a case for the balance of IFPRI's efforts to be shifted modestly in favor of engagement with policymakers and dissemination of research outputs. Again, this Report does not suggest that IFPRI's performance in this area needs radical overhaul. In recent years, in particular, the more frequent use of the Research Briefing format and publication of negotiation-relevant research under the Director General's authority to avoid impractical delays associated with peer review, are encouraging. The recommendations later in this Section offer some suggestions for cost-effective ways in which this could be done.

The conclusion that more effort is needed at the policy end of the spectrum of IFPRI's research targets does not detract from evidence presented in the Report of the "international public good" value of some of IFPRI's investment in more basic research capacity. The results in particular of the RePEc database downloads suggest considerable value is derived by other scholars from some of IFPRI's more scholarly trade-related research such as the PSE studies. Similarly, the investment made by some IFPRI staff in the updating and further development of the MAcMap database, in collaboration with its originating institution, CEPII, has obvious high value for global trade analysts generally, having been widely acknowledged as facilitating an important advance in the accuracy of trade liberalization impact modeling in recent years. This work meets the classic definitional requirements of an international public good in having benefits that are both non-rival and non-excludable. Continued investment in this work pays important dividends for IFPRI's own research standing and as a contribution to the organization's broader development and poverty reduction goals.

Enhancing recognition of IFPRI's trade research

Public recognition of IFPRI's contribution to Doha-related research has not kept pace with the recent reinvigoration of effort evident in the research outputs. One possible explanation is that much of IFPRI's work is published in the form of discussion papers or articles in dispersed publications. Some survey or interview respondents highlighted the "splash" that could be made with larger volumes of research published as an edited collection under the "house logo". This in itself takes additional effort, as those associated with the World Bank volumes of trade-related research attested. Nevertheless, the payoff in public awareness terms was very clear.

Another possibility would be for IFPRI to launch with some fanfare a new trade series of publications, or indeed a regular, probably annual, research report focused on critical developments in agricultural trade for developing countries. The OECD's annual Monitoring and Evaluation reports stand as an excellent model although understandably focus mainly on developed-country agricultural policy. Identifying an indicator series along the lines of the OECD's PSE estimations might be a useful centerpiece for an IFPRI report, along with analysis of trends in policies and challenges for agriculture in the developing world. IFPRI's own 2020 Vision work also serves as a good model for focus and impact of the organization's work. Some

of the sort of effort that has been made in this program could productively be turned to IFPRI's trade work.

Building on Collaborative Work with Expert Researchers and Institutions

The highly productive collaborative work IFPRI's trade researchers have done with think tanks and advocacy groups is worth comment and encouragement for this to continue and be expanded at the margin. Well regarded groups in the field (including ICTSD in Geneva with whom IFPRI has recently conducted joint outreach events) can be an effective way to tap into the skills these organizations have in publicizing research findings in the policy community to decisionmakers, their advisors, and the media. The World Bank is another obvious partner given its resources, skills base and development mission. The high impact of World Bank research, especially with governments, also suggests there is value for IFPRI in cooperation on relevant research and capacity building projects. Dividing responsibilities in this way allows IFPRI to concentrate the scarce time of their expert staff on conducting and presenting research but to benefit from the guidance of public policy experts on the key questions for research attention and the most effective way to communicate the findings to influential groups.

IFPRI's headquarters location in Washington also presents exceptional opportunities for working in this way and more might be done, for example, with more policy-charged panel debates on trade issues using the networks of researchers, political actors and media, to win attention for IFPRI.

Building stronger impact orientation within the organization

As noted in Section VI of this Report, a surprisingly time-consuming investment had to be made in, first of all getting a comprehensive set of IFPRI's trade-related research materials as the basis for the evaluation. Obtaining costing information by research output also proved beyond our reach. Changes to organizational structure and staffing probably complicated this task more than might be the case for other streams of IFPRI work. Nevertheless, many weeks were required to trace relevant publications for the 1999 to 2007 period. Challenges were also presented in getting ready access to citation and media reporting information linked to these particular outcomes. Considerable IFPRI research support was required to extract such in usable form. The material was all eventually accessible but for an organization concerned about impact, further investment in citation and media reporting information retrieval systems more closely linked to individual research outputs would be desirable.

Why It Is Important for IFPRI to Retain Its Focus on Trade

This Report does not argue for any significant change to the priority accorded to IFPRI's trade-related work or to its resourcing. This is not to understate the importance of retaining the enhanced effort that has been made over the past two or three years which has returned IFPRI's efforts to the higher levels of focus and attention to trade liberalization issues that have been evident for much of the organization's history.

A strong case can be made for IFPRI consolidating and continuing its work in the period ahead. Earlier Sections of the Report presented information on the way the debate about agricultural trade liberalization and development has played out through the course of the Doha negotiations

to date. Much of the struggle for consensus among the WTO's members has centered on questions about the level of ambition overall in the agreement and the most appropriate forms of special and differential treatment to be accorded to developing countries. In the necessarily political negotiating environment, what has emerged through provisions for special products and reductions or exemptions from commitments of various kinds has not necessarily reflected research conclusions of IFPRI or other well-regarded research about how to achieve the biggest possible development dividend from Doha.

These issues were tackled directly by the Warwick Commission which concluded in its Trade and Development chapter that "debate over S&D provisions in the WTO has been contentious and over-politicized and the need for substantive analysis has often been neglected". The Commission recommended that "efforts should be redoubled to design clear, concrete S&DT provisions based on solid analysis of development needs and cognizant of the reality that differing needs among developing countries call for differentiated measures" (Warwick Commission 2007, p.43).

The fact that the Doha Round has foundered on the special safeguard mechanism underlines the relevance of S&D treatment issues for development-oriented agricultural trade reform. Today more obvious differences between groups of DCs also suggest IFPRI has a role and comparative advantage in illuminating the issues. This will be so whether or not Doha can be revised. Some predict that dispute settlement is a more likely route to reform in coming years. Others point to unilateral national reforms or bilateral and regional trade deals. In all these cases, IFPRI's mission warrants continued priority for its agricultural trade work.

IFPRI's voice, which the survey and interview information suggests carries weight, especially in the developing world and development advocacy groups, was perhaps not heard as loudly as it might have been when some of the key decisions about the shape of the Doha agreement were being settled. The opportunity remains to contribute in a more targeted way in the final stages of the negotiations and through the period of implementation of an eventual agreement. Some modest adjustments to IFPRI's current efforts could help in this endeavor and recommendations are set out below.

Recommendations for Action

- 1. A modest shift in emphasis is warranted from desk-and-field research to engagement with policymakers and advocates, particularly in Geneva.**
- 2. More intensive and targeted efforts should be made to develop and actively use e-mail based dissemination of IFPRI's trade-related research materials to key participants and commentators on the Doha negotiations.**
- 3. Continued investment in IFPRI's high-caliber research capability in the trade-related area is essential; the collaboration with CEPII and involvement in the MAcMap database has been of great value and should be sustained; IFPRI involvement in the GTAP Consortium is also a high priority.**
- 4. Consideration should be given to launching new high-profile IFPRI published trade outputs; a new trade series, a compendium of IFPRI research relevant to Doha; a**

new annual report series focused on agricultural trade developments in developing countries; and other initiatives are among the possibilities.

- 5. More active collaboration with other highly-regarded institutions in the trade-related research field such as the World Bank, ICTSD, and the OECD is warranted, recognizing that each organization will have its own priorities. Particular synergies might be evident in provision of trade-related capacity strengthening for developing countries with some consideration being given to the spread of activities between countries and between training in model building and interpretation of model results.**
- 6. Productive collaboration with think tanks, development advocacy groups, and others engaged in comment and debate about agricultural trade reform is recommended. IFPRI has some work to do to rebuild awareness of its capability in this field and outreach efforts of this kind can help. High profile panel debates with themes and participants carefully chosen for impact could be useful. Recent collaboration with Hewlett Foundation, German Marshall Fund, and similar groups should be continued.**
- 7. Consideration should be given to further investment in user-friendly information retrieval systems to track the publication of IFPRI research and the associated citation and media reporting associated with each research output.**

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I—SURVEY QUESTIONS ON IFPRI’S WORK ON THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS

Gender:

Name:

Email:

Telephone number:

Type of organization you work for (need to create a list of organizations)

1. Research Institution
2. Think tank
3. Development NGO
4. National Government
5. International Organization
6. Media Organization
7. Business/Legal
8. Other (please specify)

Position within organization (need to create a list of positions)

1. Researcher
2. Policy advisor
3. Trade negotiator (Capital based)
4. Trade negotiator (Geneva based)
5. Communications/Media representative
6. Other (please specify)

Country:

1. Developed
2. Developing

- A. **WHAT RESEARCH FROM ANY SOURCE HAS BEEN MOST INFLUENTIAL IN SHAPING YOUR THINKING, OR YOUR ORGANIZATION'S APPROACH TO AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS? PLEASE GIVE UP TO THREE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES. (It would be especially helpful if you could provide any bibliographic details.)**

1. Why has this work been useful?

- B. **HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW ABOUT IFPRI'S RESEARCH WORK ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS?**

- i) Little or nothing
- ii) Have some awareness
- iii) Reasonably familiar

If you answered (ii) or (iii) to question B above, please respond to the following:

- C. **HOW USEFUL DID YOU FIND THESE PUBLICATIONS?**

- i) Not useful at all (skip to question 4)
- ii) Somewhat useful
- iii) Useful or really useful

If you answered (ii) or (iii) to question C above, please respond to the following:

1. How would you rate the overall quality of IFPRI's work on the Doha negotiations on a scale of **Extremely High / Moderately High / Not Very High**

2. Which publications were most useful to you? Please give up to three specific examples.

3. How did these publications influence your own work or your own (your organization's or government's) thinking about the Doha negotiations and developing countries?

4. Was any of IFPRI's Doha work unconvincing and if so, why?

5. Are you aware of specific ways in which IFPRI's Doha work has influenced public debate, the research community, or government policy position? If so, please elaborate.

6. Do you have suggestions for how the content or presentation of IFPRI's work on agricultural trade and the Doha negotiations could be improved for greater impact?

D. WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT IFPRI'S CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

7. Little or nothing
8. Have some awareness
9. Have participated directly

If you answered (ii) or (iii) to question B above, please respond to the following:

1. Have you participated in IFPRI's capacity building or training activities on agricultural trade liberalization and in what capacity?

2. How would you rate the usefulness of IFPRI's capacity building or training activities:
Extremely useful / Moderately useful / Not very useful

3. How will you use this training / capacity building experience in your future work?

APPENDIX II—LIST OF SURVEY AND INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS BY CATEGORY

***Indicates participation in survey rankings**

Indicates personal or telephone interview

ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS

- Jatinder S. Beti*, National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi
- David Blandford*#, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Penn State University
- Antonio Salazar Brandao*, Professor of Economics, State University of Rio de Janeiro
- Jean-Christophe Bureau*#, Professor of Economics, Agro-Paris Tech
- Papa Nuhine Dieye*, Agricultural Economist, Senegalese Institute for Agricultural Research, Dakar
- Cheickh Sadibou Fall*, Economist, ISRA-BAME, Senegal
- Joachim Bento de Souza Ferreira Filho*, Professor of Economics, University of Sao Paulo
- Harry de Gorter*, Associate Professor, Cornell University
- David Harvey*, Professor of Agriculture, University of Newcastle
- Tom Hertel*#, Distinguished Professor, Purdue University
- Tim Josling*#, Emeritus Professor, Stanford University and Senior Fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute
- Jaime de Melo*#, Professor, Department of Political Economy, University of Geneva
- Sebastien Jean*#, Research Director, INRA Public Economics Unit, Agro-Paris Tech
- John Lee*, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Mississippi State University, formerly ERS, USDA
- Sohail J. Malik*, Chairman, Innovative Development Strategies, Islamabad
- Patrick Messerlin*#, Professor of Economics and Director, Global Economy Group, Sciences-Po, Paris
- Robert Paarlberg*, Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College and Associate, Harvard University
- Abdul Salam*, Professor of Economics and Chair, Agricultural Prices Commission, Islamabad,
- Luca Salvatici*, Professor of Economics, University of Molise
- Finn Tarp*, Professor of Economics, University of Copenhagen
- Robert L Thompson*#, Professor of Agricultural Policy, University of Illinois
- Alberto Valdes*, Senior Economic Adviser, Roles of Agriculture Project, FAO
- Alan Winters*#, Professor of Economics, University of Sussex

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- Manzoor Ahmad#, Ambassador of Pakistan to the WTO and chair of TRIPS negotiations, Geneva
- Vincent Aussillou*, Policy Advisor, DG Trade, European Commission, Brussels
- Ujal Singh Bhatia*#, Ambassador of India to the WTO Geneva
- Lars Brink*#, Senior Canadian Policy Advisor, Agriculture Canada, Ottawa
- Jung-Sup Choi#, Director, Korean Rural Economic institute, Seoul
- Flavio S Damico*, Trade Negotiator, Government of Brazil, Brasilia
- Bruce Gosper#, Ambassador of Australia to the WTO and chair of the WTO General Council, Geneva

- Crawford Falconer#, Ambassador of New Zealand and Chair of Agriculture Negotiations, WTO, Geneva
- Fran Freeman*, Senior Australian Policy Advisor and Chair of OECD Joint Working Party, Canberra
- Gusmardi Bustami*#, Ambassador of Indonesia to the WTO, Geneva
- Anastassios Haniotis*#, Senior Advisor and Trade Negotiator, DG Agri, European Commission, Brussels
- Clodoaldo Huguene#y, Ambassador of Brazil to the WTO, Geneva
- Faizel Ismail*#, Ambassador of South Africa to the WTO, Geneva
- Christopher Langman*#, former Trade Negotiator, now Ambassador of Australia to the OECD, Paris
- Ahmed Mukhtar#, Commercial Secretary of Pakistan, Delegation to the WTO, Geneva
- Hidenori Murakami #, Vice-Minister, International Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF), Tokyo
- Susan Offutt*, Chief Economist, Government Accounting Office, formerly ERS, USDA, Washington DC
- George Mina*, Advisor to Australian Minister for Trade, former Trade Negotiator, Canberra
- Donna Roberts*#, Senior Economist, ERS, USDA, Washington DC
- Ivan Roberts*, Senior Research Consultant, ABARE, Department of Agriculture, Canberra
- Guillermo Valles#, Ambassador of Uruguay and Chair of the WTO Rules Negotiations, WTO, Geneva
- Steve Verhuel*, Senior Trade Negotiator for Canada, Agriculture Canada, Ottawa

THINK TANKS, FOUNDATIONS AND NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

- Christophe Bellmann*#, Program Director, Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Devt (ICTSD), Geneva
- Hugh Corbet*, President, Cordell Hull Institute, Washington DC
- Kimberley Elliott*#, Senior Fellow, Centre for Global Development and Peterson Institute, Washington
- Joe Guinan*#, Economic Policy Program Officer, German Marshall Fund of the US, Brussels
- Ralph Grossi#, President, American Farmland Trust, Washington DC
- Charlotte Hedebrand*#, CEO, International Food and Agriculture Trade Policy Council (IPC), Washington
- Sallie James*, Trade Policy Analyst, Cato Institute, Washington DC
- Gawain Kripke*, Director, Policy and Research, Oxfam America
- Isabel Mazzei*#, Policy Advisor, Oxfam International, Geneva
- Jim McDonald*#, Vice President for Policy and Programs, Bread for the World, Washington DC
- Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz#, Chief Executive, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Devt, Geneva
- Eric Munoz*, Policy Advisor, Bread for the World, Washington DC
- Sandra Polaski*#, Director, trade, Equity and Development Program, Carnegie Endowment, Washington
- Susan Sechler*#, Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the US, Washington DC
- Jeff Schott*, Deputy Director, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC
- Ann Tutwiler*#, Managing Director for Trade and Development, Hewlett Foundation, Washington DC

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Economic Commission for Africa

- Mohamed Chemingui*, Economic Affairs Officer, Addis Ababa
- Mohamed Hedi Bchir*, Economist, Addis Ababa

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris

- Ken Ash*#, Deputy Director, Trade and Agriculture Directorate, OECD, Paris
- Carmel Cahill*#, Head of Policies and Trade in Agriculture Division, OECD, Paris
- Joe Dewbre*# Senior Economist, Agriculture and Development Division, OECD, Paris
- Stefan Tangermann*#, Agriculture and Trade Director, OECD, Paris
- Frank van Tongeren*#, Senior Economist, Policies and Trade in Agriculture Division, OECD, Paris

World Bank, Washington DC

- Jock Anderson#, Advisor, Strategy and Policy, Rural Development Department World Bank, Washington
- Bernard Hoekman#, Research Manager, International Trade Group, World Bank, Washington
- Julia Neilson#, Assistant to the President World Bank, Washington
- Will Martin*#, Lead Economist, Development Research Group, World Bank, Washington
- Dominique Van Der Mensbrugghe#, Lead Economist, Development Prospects Group, World Bank

World Trade Organization (WTO), Geneva

- Anabel Gonzalez*#, Director, Agriculture and Commodities Division, WTO, Geneva
- Pascal Lamy#, Director-General, WTO, Geneva
- Harsha Singh*#, Deputy Director-General, WTO, Geneva

BUSINESS AND LEGAL FIRMS

- Scott Andersen*#, Sidley and Austin LLP, Geneva
- Dan de Rosa*, Principal Economist, ADR International Ltd
- Brian Fisher*, Clarence River Associates and former Director, ABARE, Canberra
- Jason Hafemeister*#, Vice President, Allen Johnson and Associates, former senior policy advisor, USTR
- JB Penn#, Chief Economist, John Deere and former Under Secretary, USDA

THOSE CONTACTED FROM WHOM NIL OR INCOMPLETE RESPONSES WERE RECEIVED

- Channing Arndt, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University
- Agnes Benassy-Quere, CEPII, Paris
- Fred Bergsten, Director, Peterson Institute for International economics, Washington DC
- William Cline, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC
- Bruce Gardner, Distinguished Professor, University of Maryland
- Josph Francois, Professor of International Economics, University of Rotterdam
- Soren Frandsen, Director General, Danish Institute for Food and Resource Economics, Copenhagen

- Joseph Glauber, Senior Agriculture Negotiator for the US, Washington DC
- Glenn Harrison, Professor of Economics, University of Central Florida
- Anwarul Hoda, Member of the National Planning Commission, New Delhi
- Veena Jha, Coordinator, India Program, UNCTAD, New Delhi
- Ganesh Kumar, Associate Professor, Indira Ghandi Institute, Mumbai
- Anne Krueger, Professor of International Economics, SAIS, John Hopkins University
- Leo Maier, Agriculture and Rural Development advisor, European Commission, Brussels
- Karl Mielke, Professor, University of Guelph
- Mary Minch, Former Senior Agriculture Negotiator, European Commission, Brussels
- Javier Illescas Mucha, Director, Office of the International Economy, Government of Peru, Lima
- Bob Norris, Agricultural Trade Negotiator, European Commission, Brussels
- Andre Nassar, Director-General, Institute for International Trade Negotiations (ICONE), Sao Paolo
- Manoj Panda, Professor, Indira Ghandi Institute, Mumbai
- John Quinn, Agriculture and Commodities Division, WTO, Geneva
- Mohan Man Sainju, Vice Chairman, Poverty Alleviation Fund, Kathmandu
- Alexander Sarris, Director, Commodities and Trade Division, FAO, Rome
- Naresh Servansing, Ambassador for Mauritius at the WTO, Geneva
- Ramesh Sharma, Senior Economist, Trade Policy Service, FAO, Rome
- Edward Schuh, Professor, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota
- Dagfin Sorli, Ambassador of Norway to the WTO, Geneva
- Nestor Stancanelli, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Trade, Argentina
- David Tarr, Lead Economist, Development research Group, World Bank, Washington DC
- Kevin Watkins, Director, Human Development Report Office, UNDO, New York
- David Vanzetti, Economic Consultant, Canberra
- Gerard Viatte, former Director, Agriculture Directorate, OECD, Paris
- Jeevika Weerahewa, Senior Lecturer, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka

APPENDIX III—CURRENT AND PRE-2004 IFPRI ORGANIZATION CHARTS

IFPRI Organizational Chart 2008



APPENDIX IV—TIMELINE FOR THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS AND RELATED EVENTS

1994	(March) GATT Marrakesh Conference adopted Uruguay Round outcomes and created the WTO
1995	(January) WTO established in Geneva
1996	(December) Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference introduces “new issues” into consideration
1997	(November) WTO creates framework for trade facilitation and trade related technical assistance
1999	(December) WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle disrupted by protests
2000-2001	Discussions held on negotiating proposals for further reform, submitted by 121 members
2001	(November) WTO members launch Doha Round with ambitious mandate and short timeframe
2002	US Congress passes Trade Promotion Authority
2003	(March) Chair (Harbinson) issues draft text for members’ consideration
2003	(August) US / EU Joint Text makes proposals for Cancun meeting at urging of key Members
2003	(September) WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancun deadlocked over Singapore issues and cotton
2004	Work resumes with meetings in Geneva and other capitals, new groups (G20, G33) prominent
2004	“Five Interested Parties” (US, EU, Brazil, India, Australia) actively pursue possible framework
2004	(March, April, June) Agriculture meetings in Geneva, much activity taking place in smaller groups
2004	(May) EU conditional proposal on elimination of export subsidies and dropping 3 Singapore issues
2004	(July) Negotiating meeting on Framework agreement involving around 30 Ministers and officials
2004	(August) Framework Agreement adopted; cotton reference added, notes deadline not achievable
2004	(September) WTO Panel Report on US / Brazil cotton case; (Appellate Body Report March 2005)
2005	Negotiations on “Modalities” underway with formal and informal issues meetings about monthly
2005	(December) WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, end date set for export subsidy elimination
2006	(June) chair (Falconer) issues draft modalities text
2006	(July) Doha negotiations suspended by D-G Lamy citing wide gaps in members’ positions
2007	(April) Chair (Falconer) issues “Challenges Paper” to stimulate re-engagement by members
2007	(July) Chair issues revised draft modalities text

- 2007 (July to February 2008) Intensive negotiations on key issues, much in 37 member “Room E” group
- 2008 (February) Chairs (Falconer and Stephenson) issue further revised agriculture and NAMA texts
- 2008 (May) Chairs (Falconer and Stephen) issue yet another revision of Agriculture and NAMA texts
- 2008 (July) Further revised agriculture and NAMA Texts issued and intensive Ministerial level negotiations held from 21 July in Geneva
- 2008 Director General Lang puts forward proposal to settle remaining issues on 25 July
- 2008 Doha negotiations breakdown on 29 July and are suspended

APPENDIX V—LIST OF IFPRI PUBLICATIONS RELEVANT TO THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS

* Indicates that publication was cited at least once as captured by Google Scholar

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Published between January and July 2008:

Blandford, David, Laborde, David and Martin, Will, 2008. Implications for the United States of the May 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) in cooperation with IFPRI and the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC), Geneva

Blandford, David and Orden, David, 2008. IFPRI Shadow notifications Project: US Component. Paper for IFPRI Conference on Improving WTO Transparency, Washington DC

Bouët, A. (and others????) 2008. The Expected Benefits From Trade Liberalization – Opening the Black Box of Global Trade Modeling. IFPRI Food Policy Review 8, Washington DC

Bouët, A., Bchir, H., Dimaranan, B and Thomas, M., 2008. An Evaluation of Mahgreb Trade Integration Using the MIRAGE Model, in Hufbauer, G and de Rosa, D., eds, *Mahgreb Regional and Global Integration: a Dream to be Fulfilled*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC

Bouët, A., Berisha-Krasniqui, V. and Mevel, S., 2008. Economic Partnership Agreements between European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries: What is at Stake for Senegal? IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 765, Washington DC

Bouët, A. Berisha-Krasniqui, V., Laborde, D. and Mevel, S., 2008. The Development Promise: Can the Doha Development Agenda Deliver for Least Developed Countries? IFPRI Briefing Note, Washington DC

Bouët, A., Berisha-Krasniqui, V., Mevel, S. and Sode, A., 2008. Increasing Africa's Participation in Global Trade: The Role of Preferential Market Access. IFPRI, Washington DC. *(Is this a Discussion Paper and if so what is its number???)*

Bouët, A., Mishra, S. and Roy, D., 2008. Does Africa Trade Less than it Should and Why? IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 770, Washington DC

Cororaton, Caesar B., 2008. Philippine Trade Policies and Agricultural Domestic Support. Paper for IFPRI Conference on Improving WTO Transparency, Washington DC

Gopinath, Munisamy and Laborde, David, 2008. Implications for India of the May 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) in cooperation with IFPRI and the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC), Geneva

Hoda, Anwarul and Gulati, Ashok, 2008. WTO Negotiations on Agriculture and Developing Countries. IFPRI, Washington DC

Jean, Sebastien, Josling, Tim and Laborde, David, 2008. Implications for the European Union of the May 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development in cooperation with IFPRI and the International Food and Agricultural trade Policy council (IPC), Geneva

Jean, Sebastien, Laborde, David and Martin, Will, 2008. Formulas and Flexibilities in Trade Negotiations: The Case of Sensitive Agricultural Products in the WTO.

Laborde, David, 2008. Looking for a Meaningful duty Free Quota Free Market Access Initiative in the Doha Development Agenda. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Issue Paper No. 4, Geneva

Laborde, David, Martin, Will and van der Mensbrugghe, Dominique, 2008. The Implications of the 2008 Draft Agriculture and NAMA Modalities for Developing Countries. GTAP Resource#2783 on the GTAP website (forthcoming also as an IFPRI Discussion Paper).

Orden, David, 2008. An Overview of WTO Domestic Support Notifications. Paper for IFPRI Conference on Improving WTO Transparency, Washington DC

Peterson, Everett and Orden, David, 2008. Avacado Pests and Avacado Trade. American Journal of Agricultural economics 90:2 (2008): 321-335

Published in 2007:

Berisha-Krasniqi, V., & Bouët, A. 2007. Breaking the Doha Deadlock: a Research-Oriented Perspective. Paper presented at "Realizing the Doha Development Agenda as if the Future Mattered", Seminar hosted by the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, the German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States, and the Salzburg Seminar, Salzburg, Austria, February 16-21, 2007.

Berisha-Krasniqi, V., & Bouët, A. 2007. Making the Doha Round work for all: the current state of play in multilateral agricultural liberalization. Paper presented at "Enhancing Transparency in Multilateral Trading System", a conference hosted by the Lowy Institute for International Policy Studies, Sydney, Australia, July 4, 2007. Also published on RGE Monitor at: <http://www.rgemonitor.com/>.

Bora, S., Bouët, A., & Roy, D. 2007. The marginalization of Africa in world trade, Research Brief No. 7 Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

***Bouët, A., Mevel, S., & Orden, D. 2007.** More or less ambition in the Doha Round: Winners and losers from trade liberalization with a development perspective. The World Economy 30(8): 1253-1280.

Bouët, A., & Thomas, M. 2007. Effects of Economic Growth in Developing Countries on US Agriculture: Preliminary Evidence from a Global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model. Bread for the World Institute, Hunger Report, 118-124.

Bouët, A., Laborde D. & Mevel, S. 2007. Searching for an alternative to Economic Partnership Agreements. IFPRI Research Brief No. 10. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute. Also available in French.

Bouët, A., Roy, D. & Mishra, S. 2007. Why is Africa marginalized in World Trade?, Telos-eu, le Blog de l'Agence Intellectuelle, October 22nd.

Cheng, Fuzhi and David Orden. 2007. Exchange Rate Alignment and Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) of India. *Agricultural Economics* 36: 231-41.

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Orden, David and Donna Roberts. 2007. Food Regulation and Trade under the WTO: Ten Years in Perspective. Plenary session paper in *Contributions of Agricultural Economics to Critical Policy Issues: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists* (K. Otsuka and K. Kalirajan, editors). Wiley-Blackwell: pp. 103-118.

***Orden, D., Cheng, F., Nguyen, H., Grote, U., Thomas, M., Mullen K., & Sun, D. 2007.** Agricultural Producer Support Estimates for Developing Countries: Measurement Issues and Evidence from India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. IFPRI Research Report No. 152. Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Published in 2006:

***#Bouët, A. 2006.** What can the poor expect from trade liberalization? : opening the "black box" of trade modeling. MTID Discussion Paper No. 93. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

***Bouët, A. 2006.** How much will trade liberalization help the poor? IFPRI Research Brief No. 5. Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

Bouët, A. 2006. Un choix historique pour la France. *Accomex* 69 :24-29.

Bouët, A. 2006. Le cout d'un non accord pour les PMA. Telos-eu, le Blog de l'Agence Intellectuelle.

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***Cheng, F. & Orden, D. 2005.** Exchange Rate Misalignment and its Effects on Agricultural Producer Support Estimates: Empirical Evidence from India and China. Paper presented at 2005 Annual meeting of American Agricultural Economics Association, July 24-27, Providence, RI.

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***#Mullen, K. Sun, D., Orden, D., & Gulati, A. 2004.** Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) for Agriculture in Developing Countries: Measurement Issues and Illustrations from India and China. MTID DP74, Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute

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***#Watkins, K. & von Braun, J. 2003.** Time to stop dumping on the world's poor, Annual report essay 9, Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

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***Roberts, D., I. Josling and D. Orden. 1999.** WTO Disciplines on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Barriers to Agricultural Trade: Progress, Prospects, and Implications for Developing Countries. Invited Paper, Conference on Agricultural and the New Trade Agenda from a Development Perspective, Geneva: World Bank, October.

APPENDIX VI—IFPRI STAFF AND FORMER STAFF INTERVIEWED ABOUT DOHA WORK

- Per Pinstруп-Andersen, former Director-General
- Valdete Berisha-Krasniqi, Research Assistant, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- Antoine Bouët, Senior Research Fellow, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- Cesar Cororaton, former Research Fellow, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- Xinshen Diao, Senior Research Fellow, Development Strategy and Governance Division
- Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, former Senior Research Fellow, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- Ashok Gulati, Director, IFPRI Office in Asia, New Delhi
- John Hoddinott, Senior Research Fellow/Deputy Director, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division
- Nicholas Minot, Senior Research Fellow, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- David Laborde, Post Doctoral Fellow, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- David Orden, Senior Research Fellow, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- Shahidur Rashid, Senior Research Fellow, Ethiopia Office
- Sherman Robinson, former Director, Macroeconomics and Trade Division
- Devesh Roy, Research Fellow, Research Fellow, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- Marcelle Thomas, Research Analyst, Research Analyst, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- Maximo Torero, Director, Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division
- Joachim von Braun, Director-General
- Klaus von Grebmer, Director, Communications Division

APPENDIX VII—IFPRI’S TRADE RELATED CAPACITY STRENGTHENING ACTIVITIES DURING THE DOHA PERIOD

Nairobi, Kenya - August 4-9, 2007

Antoine Bouët conducted a session on spatial models and measuring NTBs for researchers from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as part of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa project

Lima, Peru - October 16-27 2006, November 11-23 2006 and January 30-February 3, 2007

Antoine Bouët and Simon Mevel conducted sessions for Government officials from the Foreign Trade and Finance Ministries and university researchers. Training covered use of the Mirage model and MAcMap database to assist with Peru’s assessment of the impacts of FTAs

Dakar, Senegal – February 4-29, 2007 and May 13-25, 2007

Antoine Bouët and Simon Mevel conducted training using the Mirage model and MAcMaps database for economists from the Ministries of Trade and Finance, the University of Dakar and the Senagalese Institute of Agricultural Research. A report was completed by the Senagalese economists on the impact of Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and ACP countries.

Sri Lanka - November 1-15 and November 30-December 15, 2007

Simon Mevel and Marcelle Thomas conducted sessions on partial and general equilibrium modeling with a focus on assessing the impacts of Doha outcomes

Islamabad, Pakistan – May 25-28 and July 3-14, 2006

Cesar Cororaton conducted training in CGE modeling at the Institute of Development Economics

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 20-23, March 2006

Shahidur Rashid led a training workshop on analysis of market performance/price policy analysis

Washington DC, USA – December 15, 2005

David Orden worked with a 12-member Cochran Fellows trade policy group from Africa, the Near East and South Asia with a focus on trade policy and developing countries

Dhaka, Bangladesh – March –April 2002

Channing Arndt, Carolina Diaz-Bonilla, Paul Dorosh (IFPRI) and Frank van Tongeren conducted a WTO trade modeling workshop with 24 participants from research institutes, universities and regional governments

Dhaka, Bangladesh – September 2002

A second WTO trade modeling workshop was conducted by Channing Arndt, Paul Dorosh (IFPRI) and Christen Lungren which focused on the use of modeling tools (combining CGE and micro-simulation models) to examine policy scenarios associated with financial crisis and poverty in Indonesia

Jakarta, Indonesia – February 2002

Hans Lofgren and Anne-Sophie Robilliard (DIAL) and Sherman Robinson (IFPRI) conducted a World Bank funded course on CGE modeling in GAMS to 17 participants from the Indonesian Institute of Social and Economic Research and BAPPENAS, Government of Indonesia

Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania – 2002

In association with a country study of Tanzania led by Peter Wobst under the MERISSA project a number of Tanzanian researchers from the University of Dar Es Salaam participated in training on Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) for Policy Analysis. Training on SAM-based CGE modeling had also been provided to Tanzanian researchers in previous years though courses conducted in Malawi and South Africa.

IMPACT ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION PAPERS

28. **Impact Evaluation of Research by the International Food Policy Research Institute on Agricultural Liberalization, Developing Countries, and the WTO's Doha Negotiations**, *by Joanna Hewitt (September 2008)*
27. **The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Mexican PROGRESA Anti-Poverty and Human Resource Investment Conditional Cash Transfer Program**, *by Jere R. Behrman (December 2007)*
26. **The Impacts of IFPRI's Global Research Program on the Sustainable Development of Less-Favored Areas**, *by John English and Mitch Renkow (November 2007)*
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